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Risks are prevalent in supply chains. While managers are familiar with common risks
such as supply disruption and demand uncertainty, new risks are constantly emerging.
These emerging risks may differ from the existing ones in important ways that alter the
decision setting, requiring managers to adopt new risk management strategies. Using
old strategies to respond to these emerging risks may be ineffective or even counterpro-
ductive. Through three studies, this dissertation examines how sourcing and capacity in-
vestment decisions are influenced by two categories of emerging risks—supplier-induced
risks and regulatory risks. Studies 1 and 2 use analytical models and behavioral ex-
periments to compare how buyers’ optimal and actual sourcing strategies differ under
supplier-induced responsibility violation risks and traditional supply disruption risks.
We document significant and robust differences in buyers’ ordering behaviors across
the two risk types and further disentangle the effects of risk structure and context
characteristics that drive the differences. Our additional analysis on the performance
implications of different sourcing strategies shows the promise of sole-sourcing from the
risk-free supplier and identifies cognitive and affective behavioral factors associated with
adopting this strategy. Study 3 uses analytical models and a numerical study to ex-
amine a vaccine manufacturer’s optimal capacity investment strategy across domestic
and overseas markets when faced with a potential risk emanating from regulations that
restrict vaccine exports from the domestic market. We characterize how a regulatory
mandate may shift the manufacturer’s overall capacity commitment strategy (produce
in one location vs. both) as well as the associated capacity levels in each location. We
further assess the impact of these changes on service level and public health outcomes
at both locations as well as globally. A general theme of this dissertation is to investi-
gate when diversification, a common strategy used to handle risks, is warranted in these
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Globalization enhances connectivity between nations and has the potential to deliver
substantial benefits to firms. Such opportunities allow firms to access a more diversified
set of supply sources and to leverage cost or technology advantages elsewhere to en-
hance their value-creation processes. They also open doors to a broader set of demand
markets, generating additional revenue streams. However, these potential benefits also
come with new risks and challenges that have important implications for supply chain
management. Without a good understanding of how these risks impact their supply
chains and what tools are available to counteract them, managers might find it chal-
lenging to navigate these emerging challenges. This dissertation focuses on two sources
of such emerging risks—suppliers and government regulations—and seeks to provide
insights to help managers better handle risks associated with sourcing (Studies 1 and
2) and capacity investment decisions (Study 3).
1
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1.2 Study 1: Sourcing Under Supply Disruption and Re-
sponsibility Violation Risks: A Behavioral Investiga-
tion
Responsibility-related issues at suppliers’ sites are attracting increased attention in the
media and increased scrutiny from NGOs and consumers, making sourcing decisions
more complex. Study 1 examines this type of emerging risk along with traditional
supplier-induced risks. More specifically, we present a comparative framework to con-
trast buyers’ sourcing decisions in light of two types of supplier-induced risks that shape
the supply-demand balance: responsibility violation risk that could influence a firm’s
demand (e.g., Guo et al. 2016) and the relatively well-studied supply disruption risk
that influences the quantity of products available for sale (e.g., Gurnani et al. 2014).
We analyze settings involving one buyer and two suppliers in which sourcing from one
supplier is risk-free, whereas sourcing from the other introduces either supply disruption
or responsibility violation risk. Inspired by risk matrices frequently used in practice, we
characterize risk by its likelihood (i.e., the probability of the disruption or violation) and
impact (i.e., the fraction of supply or demand lost in the event of a supply disruption or
responsibility violation), respectively. We address the following research questions: (1)
How does buyer sourcing behavior vary when faced with the risk of supply disruption
versus responsibility violation? (2) How do the likelihood and the impact of a disruption
or violation influence buyers’ decisions under the two risk types? (3) What implications
does buyer sourcing behavior have on key performance measures?
We first utilize analytical models to set benchmarks for buyers’ profit-maximizing
strategies given different risk likelihood and impact levels. We then test how individuals
actually behave in an incentive-compatible experiment, with participants recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) acting as buyers in a sourcing task. The experiment
utilizes a mixed design with risk type manipulated between-subjects (supply disruption
risk vs. responsibility violation risk) and decision scenario manipulated within-subjects
(3 levels of risk likelihood × 4 levels of risk impact). In total, 217 MTurk participants
(53.0% male; Mage = 39.5) completed all of the required activities. Our analyses reveal
the following insights:
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(1) From a normative perspective, sole-sourcing is always the profit-maximizing strategy
under the two risk types. Furthermore, under both risk types, an impact threshold
separates the high and low impact conditions; within each condition, likelihood
further determines the buyer’s optimal sourcing strategies. The high-cost supplier
only becomes an attractive choice when the impact is high. When the impact is
low, the low-cost supplier is always optimal, and the order quantity may deviate
from demand if the likelihood is sufficiently high. The direction of this deviation
differs across the two risk types: the order quantity is set lower than demand under
responsibility violation risk to ensure there is no leftover inventory if a responsibility
violation occurs, while it is set higher than demand under supply disruption risk to
ensure there is sufficient inventory to meet demand in case of a supply disruption.
(2) Buyers in the behavioral experiment tend to diversify their orders across the two
suppliers, with more diversification under supply disruption risk relative to responsi-
bility violation risk. In addition, buyers under responsibility violation risk are more
likely to correctly sole-source from the high-cost supplier. But when the low-cost
supplier is the optimal solution, there is no significant difference between the two
risk types regarding buyers’ tendency to correctly sole-source from that supplier.
(3) Despite the aforementioned differences with respect to diversification and correct
sole-sourcing behaviors, we do observe important similarities in buyers’ ordering
behavior across the two risk types. Specifically, participants adjust their order
allocations similarly across the two risk types when risk likelihood increases, even
though more customized strategies would be beneficial.
(4) The behavioral tendencies mentioned previously result in a significant loss in ex-
pected profit, especially under responsibility violation risk.
Taken together, the findings highlight that buyers’ ordering behavior deviates from
the normative benchmarks and, more importantly, there are critical differences in buy-
ers’ ordering behavior across the two risk types in terms of diversification and preference
of supplier to source from. Since the decision settings under the two risk types differ in
multiple dimensions, identifying the primary source of the variation is challenging. In
the following study, we provide a parsimonious approach to delineate the characteristics
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of the decision settings under the two risk types and disentangle the underlying driving
forces.
1.3 Study 2: Supply Disruption vs. Responsibility Viola-
tion Risks: The Influence of Structure and Context
Building on the results of Study 1, in Study 2, we continue our inquiry into buyers’
sourcing behavior under supply disruption and responsibility violation risks. Specifi-
cally, we have three goals for Study 2. First, we attempt to identify the underlying
forces that drive differences in buyers’ sourcing behaviors between the two risk types
identified in Study 1. Based on our risk taxonomy in Study 1, we introduce three ad-
ditional risk types to disentangle the effects of structure (i.e., whether a risk influences
the supply or demand side of the supply chain and whether the influence is focal to the
impacted supplier or crosses over to the entire supply base) and context (i.e., whether
the risky event is a process disruption or business practice violation). Second, we aim to
replicate the results of Study 1 regarding buyers’ different ordering behaviors across the
two risk types by using a different subject pool with management experience. Finally,
we explore how buyers’ sourcing strategies influence their profits and what behavioral
factors are associated with their specific strategy choices. We address the following
research questions in Study 2: (1) Are the main insights revealed in Study 1 robust to
managerial experience and the assistance of decision support? (2) What structure and
context characteristics drive buyers’ ordering behavior? (3) How do buyers’ sourcing
strategies influence their profit performance?
We recruited participants with management experience from the Prolific academic
platform to perform the same sourcing task as in Study 1. We consider five different
treatments in Study 2: in addition to the supply disruption and responsibility violation
risks considered in Study 1, we introduce three new treatments that systematically vary
the structure and context characteristics. In total, 531 participants (57.1% male; Mage
= 43.4) completed all of the required activities. Our results show that:
(1) Buyers’ ordering behaviors under supply disruption and responsibility violation risks
differ significantly in a way that aligns with the patterns we observe in Study 1,
which confirms the robustness of the results.
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(2) Structure characteristics, especially whether the influence of the risk crosses over
to the entire supply base, play a dominant role in influencing buyers’ ordering
patterns. In contrast, the context characteristic appears to have a limited influence
as it matters only for settings with certain structure characteristics.
(3) Diversification leads to a substantial erosion of profits, but sole-sourcing from the
high-cost supplier appears to be an attractive strategy. This is because it helps
avoid the suboptimal behavior of diversification and profit losses associated with
erroneous order quantity adjustments.
(4) Our analysis of the connection between individual differences and sourcing strategies
reveals that cognitive and affective factors are at play. Specifically, the perception
that the overall risk exposure linearly increases with sourcing quantity from the
low-cost supplier significantly increases the likelihood of diversification when the
influence of the risk crosses over to the entire supply base. In contrast, buyers who
perceive the low-cost supplier to have more control and responsibility for the risky
event are less likely to diversify and more likely to sole-source from the high-cost
supplier.
These insights suggest that buying firms have opportunities to nudge managers to
make better decisions by focusing on these two behavioral factors. By doing so, they
are more likely to adopt sourcing strategies that can improve their profit performance.
In addition, if such risks involve business practice violations, these strategies also have
the potential to lead to better societal outcomes, creating a win-win scenario.
1.4 Study 3: Capacity Investment in Global Vaccine Sup-
ply Chains under Regulatory Risks
In Study 3, we shift our attention from supplier-induced risks to regulatory risks and ex-
amine how they influence capacity investment decisions in global vaccine supply chains.
The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates how global crises can create considerable pressure
on healthcare supply chains. Given the vital role of vaccines in efforts to combat the
pandemic, a number of governments have enacted vaccine export controls in various
forms (e.g., Vela and Heath 2021, Williams and Stacey 2021), despite warnings from
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a variety of relevant communities on the danger of “vaccine nationalism” (e.g., Wein-
traub et al. 2020, Kupferschmidt 2020). Such government interventions to limit exports
present unique challenges to vaccine manufacturers with respect to managing their in-
ternational production and distribution networks. In this study, we refer to the country
or market from which export is banned as the ‘domestic’ market. We refer to other
locations where there is demand for the production in question as the ‘overseas’ mar-
ket. This study aims to examine the impact of such regulatory mandates on a vaccine
manufacturer’s capacity investment decisions and the resultant effects on service level
and public health outcome. Specifically, we investigate the following research questions
in Study 3. (1) When faced with a regulatory mandate, how does a vaccine manufac-
turer change its capacity commitment strategy (i.e., pool all production in the domestic
market vs. produce in both markets) and corresponding capacity levels? (2) How do
these decisions change based on the type of regulatory mandate imposed? (3) What
implications do these decisions have on key performance measures related to vaccine
availability and public health outcome?
We study the impact of two types of regulatory mandates: a random ban, where
there is a probability that the government could ban export to the overseas country
outright, and priority requirement, where the firm must ensure it meets all domestic
demand before being allowed to export. Our analytical models and numerical study
reveal the optimal capacity investment strategy for a vaccine manufacturer and the
associated policy implications for the domestic government. Specifically, our results
show that:
(1) The implementation of a regulatory mandate might induce the manufacturer to
change its capacity commitment strategy from pooling (i.e., investing in capacity
only in the domestic market) to diversifying (i.e., investing in the domestic and
overseas markets). The manufacturer always diversifies if it is most profitable to
fulfill overseas demand with overseas capacity.
(2) In general, a random ban is more likely to induce a change in the manufacturer’s
strategy than the priority requirement. The domestic country’s population advan-
tage over the overseas country increases the likelihood that the manufacturer needs
to change its strategy under the priority requirement but reduces that likelihood
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under a random ban.
(3) A random ban always results in a decrease in the manufacturer’s domestic capacity
level, whereas a priority requirement could lead to an increase or decrease in its
domestic capacity level.
(4) A reduction in domestic capacity level does not necessarily result in a lower domes-
tic service level since the imposed regulatory mandates effectively reserve a larger
portion of the available vaccine capacity for the domestic market. However, in cir-
cumstances where mandates lead to a severe reduction in the domestic capacity,
both domestic service level and public health outcome suffer. Hence, governments
should be extremely wary and mindful of the unintended consequences of imposing
such mandates.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 surveys the relevant
operations and supply chain literature related to managing risks in sourcing and capacity
decisions, and highlights how the studies in this dissertation differ from and complement
prior research. The details of this dissertation’s three studies are presented in chapters 3,
4 and 5. This dissertation concludes with chapter 6, which summarizes the key insights
related to sourcing and capacity investment decisions when faced with supplier-induced
risks and regulatory risks, respectively.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Sourcing Decisions and Supplier-induced Risks
Supply and demand uncertainty are common in supply chains, and mismatches between
the two can result in substantial economic loss (Snyder and Shen 2007). Prior research
on supply uncertainty has focused on identifying the types and sources of supply dis-
ruptions and analyzing methods of managing specific risks (Vakharia and Yenipazarli
2009). Gurnani et al. (2012) and Kouvelis et al. (2011) discuss different issues related to
managing supply disruptions, including inventory management and contracting, from
analytical and empirical perspectives and offer risk management strategies that utilize
both operational and financial levers. Snyder et al. (2016) provide a recent comprehen-
sive survey of analytical studies on supply chain disruptions. These studies demonstrate
that the choice of suppliers is a vital aspect of coping with and recovering from supply
chain disruptions. Prior research also utilizes behavioral methods to investigate sourc-
ing issues in managing supply disruptions (e.g., Gurnani et al. 2014). In a systematic
review of the supplier selection literature, Wetzstein et al. (2016) further remark that
“Behavioral issues in SS [supplier selection] will receive further academic attention from
both an analytical and empirical perspective.” (p. 320)
Although they are not as well-studied as supply disruptions, social and environ-
mental responsibility issues are receiving increased scrutiny from customers and NGOs,
leading to greater scholarly attention, particularly from the operations management
research community (Lee and Tang 2018). For example, prior analytical studies have
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examined child labor (e.g., Cho et al. 2019) and hazard materials (e.g., Kraft et al.
2013) in supply chains and have proposed solutions, including auditing and inspections
(e.g., Plambeck and Taylor 2016, Dawande and Qi 2020), supplier improvement invest-
ments (e.g., Kraft et al. 2020), and other contracting methods (e.g., Chen and Lee
2017). As previously discussed, suppliers’ potential lack of compliance with social and
environmental standards imposes risk on the buyer through its impact on customer per-
ception and ultimately, demand. The choice of the upstream supplier may expose the
buyer to potential customer boycott and as a result, risk mitigation strategies aimed at
tackling supply disruptions may prove ineffective in managing the demand-side influ-
ence (e.g., Guo et al. 2016, Huang et al. 2017). Our study contributes to an emerging
stream of literature that investigates sourcing decisions under responsibility violation
risk through a behavioral lens (e.g., Mahmoudzadeh and Siemsen 2019). More impor-
tantly, our research provides a framework to analyze sourcing decisions under risks of
supply disruption and responsibility violation and unify the two streams of literature,
allowing us to compare the influence of the two risk types on buyers’ sourcing decisions.
Five behavioral studies on sourcing decisions are particularly relevant to our study.
Csermely and Minner (2015) analyze tradeoffs between speed and cost in a dual-sourcing
setting comprised of a fast but expensive supplier and a slow but cheaper supplier. They
find that having the fast option available is beneficial even though participants tend to
overuse this option. Our study differs from this work in that we evaluate the impact
of risk differences, rather than lead times, on supplier selection. Goldschmidt et al.
(2020) examine how the presence of high-impact, low-probability disruptions influences
buyers’ choice of the supply base from a group of homogeneous suppliers. They find
that people under-diversify on average and tend to only temporarily increase the number
of suppliers immediately after the occurrence of a disruption. We examine a different
scenario in which the buyer faces heterogeneous suppliers. Furthermore, our model is
not constrained by the requirement to split orders equally among all chosen suppliers,
and there is no fixed cost for maintaining relationships with each supplier.
Gurnani et al. (2014) examine sourcing decisions when a buyer faces a reliable but
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expensive supplier and an unreliable but cheaper supplier, in a setting involving com-
pounded risks of both supply disruption and yield uncertainty. They find that partici-
pants in a controlled laboratory environment tend to diversify, although it is theoreti-
cally optimal to sole-source. A model of bounded rationality is proposed to explain this
diversification bias. Our research framework builds on this study by considering two
different risk types that may influence a firm’s supply and demand, respectively. In ad-
dition, our analysis of influencing behavioral factors sheds light on potential contributors
to diversification bias in sourcing decisions. Kalkanci (2017) focuses on risk mitigation
strategies to combat supplier capacity uncertainty, comparing supplier diversification
and improvement options. The experimental results show that buyers do not diversify
as effectively as the optimal solution suggests (they order more evenly across the two
suppliers) but rather choose improvement efforts that are more consistent with theory.
Our research setting is different because we compare sourcing decisions under the risks
of supply disruption and responsibility violation, while Kalkanci (2017) contrasts two
different options to handle supplier capacity uncertainty.
Building on Guo et al. (2016), Mahmoudzadeh and Siemsen (2019) develop a behav-
ioral model to examine buyers’ dual-sourcing behavior induced by customer segmen-
tation in a responsible sourcing context. They evaluate the effectiveness of different
tactics to influence customer reactions to promote responsible sourcing. In contrast,
our study focuses on buyers’ sourcing decisions when faced with two different types of
risk and documents the existence of diversification bias even when the market is not
segmented. Finally, while Mahmoudzadeh and Siemsen (2019) focus on the cognitive
aspect of decision-making, our work considers both cognitive and affective aspects (e.g.,
Weber and Johnson 2009, Loewenstein et al. 2001).
2.2 Capacity Investment Decisions under Risks
Capacity planning problems have always been a key part of firms’ operations (Van Mieghem
2003, Song et al. 2020). As more firms expand their business presence to new geogra-
phies, it becomes critical to carefully design their production network to coordinate
across locations. Thanks to globalization and booming international trade, more firms
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have had the opportunity to enter other countries to build factories and sell to local mar-
kets. For multinational firms and their global supply chains, the capacity design issue is
even more critical since it requires extra lead time for planning and execution. Facing a
series of interesting phenomena and questions in this domain, operations management
researchers have utilized different approaches to tackle these challenges, offering many
practical insights to guide firms’ global network capacity decisions.
One framework that has received particular attention is the newsvendor network
(Van Mieghem and Rudi 2002). It has been widely used to study multi-location capac-
ity and inventory problems, especially in global supply chains. For example, Lu and
Van Mieghem (2009) adopt this framework to analyze the network design and reshoring
decisions of an international firm that needs to set up a manufacturing network for
a common component used in all products and local assembly lines that tailor to the
specific needs of different countries. The key risk in setting capacity levels arises from
demand uncertainty, but other factors, such as exchange rate fluctuations, are also con-
sidered (e.g., Dong et al. 2010). Our study introduces emerging regulatory risks to this
stream of literature and highlights how this risk influences the manufacturer’s capacity
commitment strategy and subsequent fulfillment decisions.
Risks associated with governmental policies in global supply chains are not new
in operations literature. Prior studies have examined a variety of issues concerning
tax, tariff, and trade policies and their associated risks, and their influence on pro-
curement (e.g., Wang et al. 2011), supply base (e.g., Chae et al. 2019), postponement
strategy (e.g., Choi et al. 2012), and supply chain configuration (e.g., Hsu and Zhu
2011). However, this literature typically focuses on governments’ economic incentives in
international trade (e.g., Dong and Kouvelis 2020). A series of recent incidents reveal
governments’ other motives related to nationalism and national security. In addition,
national governments have been increasingly likely to implement active interventions.
As these interventions create new complications in supply chain management, as exem-
plified in the COVID-19 pandemic (Pournader et al. 2020), it is important to understand
how this form of emerging political risk can potentially influence supply chain capacity
design and supply chain resilience (Song et al. 2020). Current literature does not pro-
vide needed guidance for firms to react and manage these risks. This study intends to
bridge this gap and offer insights that will not only benefit firms for their operations
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during emergencies but also guide their long-term planning in the post-COVID era, as
more and more governments are revising their national supply chain strategies (e.g.,
Wilkie 2021, Weiss 2021). From the government’s perspective, this study evaluates the
efficacy of such regulatory mandates so that governments can understand what these
mandates may entail and make informed decisions accordingly.
Our research also directly connects to vaccine supply chain literature, especially
research on vaccine production (Duijzer et al. 2018). This component of the vaccine
supply chain faces risks associated with supply and demand. On the supply side, due to
the production technologies involved, supply reduction resulting from yield uncertainty
is a common issue for certain vaccines, such as influenza (Deo and Corbett 2009). On
the demand side, the quantity of vaccines needed is difficult to forecast due to complex
contextual as well as individual factors (MacDonald 2015). For example, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to the influence of the anti-vaccination movement and
general vaccine hesitancy (Blume 2006, Johnson et al. 2020), the concern over rapid
development and approval of COVID-19 vaccine candidates is cited by some people as
an important reason for not wanting to be vaccinated (Tyson et al. 2020).
Our study differs from this broad stream of literature in two ways. First, we exam-
ine vaccine production issues during sudden outbreaks, which has not received enough
attention in prior research (Duijzer et al. 2018). Second, we shed light on the influ-
ence of risks that arise from governments’ regulatory interventions on vaccine supply
chains. National governments’ moves, which aim at improving domestic welfare, neg-
atively affect the availability of vaccines to other countries, significantly influencing
vaccine allocations (Duijzer et al. 2018) and enlarging disparity. To quantify the impact
from different angles (Lemmens et al. 2016), we not only consider service level but also
measure public health outcomes by taking into account the herd immunity effect (Fine
et al. 2011).
Chapter 3
Study 1: Sourcing under Supply
Disruption and Responsibility
Violation Risks: A Behavioral
Investigation
3.1 Introduction
Enhanced international connectivity enables companies to operate on a global scale,
allowing access to diversified supply bases. While this development facilitates opportu-
nities to lower sourcing costs, it also introduces new challenges as low-cost suppliers in
remote locations may expose buying firms to new risks. Against this backdrop, supplier
selection has become increasingly complex as sourcing managers must balance between
different cost levels and risk types to ensure a steady supply-demand stream.
Previous research examining the influence of supplier-induced risks on sourcing de-
cisions focuses primarily on supply disruption risk, which can lead to potential inter-
ruptions in the supply line (see, e.g., Snyder and Shen 2007, Snyder et al. 2016). This
includes yield losses due to machine breakdowns or material shortages, or more signifi-
cant supply disruptions due to plant closures or natural disasters. However, less research
has examined how suppliers might expose a firm to responsibility violation risk, which
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has potential demand-side ramifications. For example, suppliers’ failure to engage in
responsible practices — such as exposing employees to unsafe working conditions, em-
ploying child labor, or using environmentally harmful materials in their products — can
lead to customer boycotts and subsequent reductions in demand for buying firms (e.g.,
Barton et al. 2018). One company recently plagued by such responsibility violations is
global food giant Nestlé, which faced allegations of forced labor and child labor issues in
its supply chains, eventually leading to customer boycotts (Kelly 2016, Vasil 2016). As
customer awareness of such incidents and NGOs’ attention to corporate responsibility
increase, the prospect of responsibility violations raises new challenges with respect to
firms’ sourcing decisions.
Responsibility violations, once reported, can attract serious negative publicity for
brands and firms. Unlike news coverage for supply disruptions, which commonly focuses
on specific incidents, press for responsibility-related issues may generalize to harsh judg-
ment for firms’ overall business conduct, resulting in broader consequences that spill over
to other business units within the firm. Furthermore, as customers are willing to take
actions to punish firms or brands they perceive as irresponsible or unaccountable, the
potential loss in customer loyalty and market share can be more difficult to tackle.
Facing a risk that results in losses on the supply side, firms may buffer from negative
consequences through higher inventory levels or larger order quantities. However, once
exposed to a risk that influences the demand side, firms have limited operational levers
available to counteract strategically. The broader consequences and a lack of effective
countermeasures to violation events highlight the structural differences between supply
disruption and responsibility violation risks. These differences imply a higher financial
stake of brand degradation under responsibility violation risk, which requires buyers
facing this emerging type of risk to engage in a different cognitive processing mode
when conceiving their sourcing strategies.
In addition to structural differences, the context of the events that each risk poten-
tially triggers are also different. While potential supply disruptions and responsibility
violations are both unpleasant, the latter context can be more negatively emotion-laden
(Luce 1998). Due to the possibility of collaborating with unethical businesses and being
portrayed as an irresponsible firm in the news, buyers may be reluctant to source from a
risky supplier with low-cost. In addition, while supply disruptions might be perceived as
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exogenous to the control of suppliers (and the buying firm, by association), responsibil-
ity violations require suppliers’ direct participation. Hence, buyers may regard sourcing
from suppliers with limited business practice visibility as an endorsement of such ques-
tionable behaviors. As prior research has shown that people’s moral judgments differ for
harm resulting from omissions vs. commissions (e.g., Sparanca et al. 1991), intentional
engagement with suppliers with potential business conduct issues might activate buy-
ers’ affective responses differently than purchasing from suppliers with potential business
disruptions. Therefore, buyers facing responsibility violation risk in their supply chains
are confronted with a decision-making context with stronger emotional valence.
In this study, we present a comparative framework to examine buyers’ sourcing
behavior when faced with different types of supplier-induced risks that may lead to
supply-demand imbalance. We utilize the setting of a buyer who faces two suppliers:
sourcing from one supplier costs more but involves no risk, while sourcing from the other
costs less but may introduce either supply disruption risk or responsibility violation
risk. In deciding how to allocate orders between the two suppliers, the buyer’s cognitive
processing and affective reactions may be activated in different ways, depending on the
type of risk involved. Within this context, our study addresses the following research
questions: (1) How does buyer sourcing behavior vary when faced with the risk of
supply disruption versus responsibility violation? (2) How do the likelihood (i.e., the
probability of the disruption or violation) and the impact (i.e., the fraction of supply
or demand lost in the event of a supply disruption or responsibility violation) influence
buyers’ decisions under the two risk types? (3) What implications does buyer sourcing
behavior have on key performance measures?
We address these questions by first analyzing the structure of buyers’ profit-maximizing
sourcing strategies using analytic models. We demonstrate that under both risk types,
sole-sourcing is always optimal, and the specific optimal sourcing strategy (i.e., which
supplier to source from and how much to order) varies based on likelihood and impact
levels. Against these normative benchmarks, we then develop behavioral hypotheses
and test them using an experiment with incentivized human participants to examine
individuals’ actual sourcing decisions across the two risk types. In our analysis, we ex-
amine (i) whether buyers diversify, and (ii) whether buyers’ supplier preferences differ
from the optimal solution.
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Our experimental data show that buyers facing responsibility violation risk diversify
less than those facing supply disruption risk. The former group is also more likely to
correctly select the optimal supplier when the high-cost supplier is the optimal choice,
but there is no difference between the two groups when the low-cost supplier is optimal.
Despite these differences, buyers react to changes in likelihood levels in a similar way
across the two risk types. Whenever the likelihood level increases, buyers divert more
orders to the high-cost supplier. This behavior exhibits in high-impact scenarios, where
it directionally aligns with optimal solutions, but also in low-impact scenarios, where
buyers should only consider the low-cost supplier. Finally, our analysis on buyers’ profit
reveals that the negative influence of these ordering behaviors on profit can be quite
significant, especially under responsibility violation risk. These findings underscore the
critical need for managers to understand how the two risk dimensions uniquely influence
a firm’s overall exposure and highlight the importance of developing tailored strategies
to manage and mitigate different types of supplier-induced risks.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present
the comparative framework, which serves as the basis for our analytical models and
behavioral hypotheses. In section 3.4, we describe our experimental design, followed by
an analysis of the experimental results in section 3.5 and post-hoc analysis in section 3.6.
We conclude in section 3.7 with a discussion of the implications of our study findings
and directions for future research.
3.2 Comparative Framework and Normative Benchmarks
To inform our behavioral hypotheses, we first introduce a comparative framework that
captures the sourcing tradeoff faced by a buyer (e.g., a sourcing manager within a retail
firm) seeking to procure a product that will be sold at retail price p to a potential
demand base of d units within a single selling season. The buyer chooses how much
to order from two supplier candidates, knowing that any product available in excess
of demand has no salvage value. The suppliers offer products of the same quality but
differ in both wholesale price and potential risk. Sourcing from the high-cost supplier
(denoted as H) involves no risk but incurs a higher per-unit cost cH . Sourcing from the
other supplier (denoted as L) incurs a lower cost cL (cL < cH < p; c∆ ≡ cH − cL) but
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introduces the risk of either a supply disruption (SD) or a responsibility violation (RV).
To capture the most essential characteristics of the two types of risk, we draw inspiration
from risk matrices, which have been frequently used by companies and organizations in
practice to manage a variety of uncertainties. Such matrices often depict risk through
two dimensions—likelihood and impact—with each cell of the matrix indicating the
appropriate strategy when faced with a certain likelihood and impact level. Inspired
by these matrices, we also characterize risk in our research by its likelihood (i.e., the
probability of a disruption or violation; denoted by δi, i = SD,RV ) and its impact
(i.e., the consequence of the disruption or violation; denoted by γi). In this setting, the
buyer’s sourcing decision is to choose how much to order from each supplier, denoted
by Qj , j = L,H, with Q = QL +QH .
3.2.1 Normative Benchmark for Supply Disruption Risk
First, consider the case where sourcing from the low-cost supplier introduces the possi-
bility of a supply disruption. We denote the likelihood of the disruption by δSD ∈ (0, 1).
The impact is captured by the parameter γSD ∈ (0, 1], which represents the proportion
of products that would not be delivered if a disruption occurs. Specifically, if supplier
L experiences a disruption, the buyer will only receive and pay for a fraction of the
ordered quantity, i.e., (1 − γSD)QL. The buyer’s expected profit in this scenario is as
follows:
πSD(QL, QH) =(1− δSD)pmin {QL +QH , d}+ δSDpmin {(1− γSD)QL +QH , d}
− (1− γSDδSD)QLcL −QHcH .
(3.1)
Proposition 3.1 characterizes the buyer’s profit-maximizing sourcing strategy under SD.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1. When sourcing from supplier L introduces potential supply disruption
risk, the profit-maximizing strategy is to sole-source as follows:










(2) Select supplier L and
(a) set Q = QL = d when γSD >
pc∆
cH(p−cL) and δSD 6
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(b) set Q = QL = d/(1− γSD), otherwise.
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Figure 3.1: Buyer’s Optimal Sourcing Strategy under SD and RV
Proposition 3.1 specifies how the optimal sourcing strategy varies based on the likeli-
hood (δSD) and impact (γSD) of the supply disruption. Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 illustrates
the general structure. From this figure, we see that when the impact is lower than a
certain threshold (γSD 6
pc∆
cH(p−cL)), supplier L is the dominant choice, although the
order quantity may change depending on the likelihood level. For low likelihood, it
is optimal to simply order the demand level. However, when the likelihood increases
beyond a threshold (δSD >
cL
p−γSD(p−cL)), it becomes advantageous to order more than
the demand level in order to counteract the increased chance of yield loss.
The recommended sourcing strategy differs when the impact is high (γSD >
pc∆
cH(p−cL)).
Now, supplier H emerges as the dominant choice in an interior region for moderate like-
lihood levels, while supplier L is still preferred otherwise. In the high likelihood region
in which supplier L is preferred, it is again advantageous to order more than the de-
mand level to counteract the potential yield loss. These insights are formalized in the
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following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. An increase in the likelihood of supply disruption influences the
buyer’s optimal sourcing strategy as follows:
(1) Low impact condition (γSD 6
pc∆
cH(p−cL)): the buyer always chooses supplier L but
the order quantity Q∗L increases from d to d/(1− γSD) as δSD crosses the threshold
cL
p−γSD(p−cL) from below;
(2) High impact condition (γSD >
pc∆
cH(p−cL)): the buyer switches from supplier L (Q
∗
L =
d) to supplier H (Q∗H = d) when δSD crosses the threshold
c∆
γSD(p−cL) from below
and then back to supplier L (Q∗L = d/(1− γSD)) when δSD further increases above
the threshold γSDcH−c∆γSDcL .
3.2.2 Normative Benchmark for Responsibility Violation Risk
Next, consider the case where sourcing from supplier L introduces the possibility of
a responsibility-related violation. As highlighted in section 3.1, such violations may
include the use of child labor or the exploitation of natural resources. This type of
supplier-induced risk can also be characterized by its likelihood δRV ∈ (0, 1) and its
potential impact γRV ∈ (0, 1]. However, the structure of a responsibility violation is
different from the supply disruption case. Specifically, while a supply disruption influ-
ences the quantity of products for sale, a responsibility violation has the potential to
influence customer demand. Following Guo et al. (2016), we assume that if a responsi-
bility violation comes to light, a fraction (γRV ) of customers will boycott the products
sourced by the buyer and take their business elsewhere, i.e., the demand faced by the
buyer is reduced to (1 − γRV )d. From the customer’s perspective, it is often difficult
to directly discern the specific supplier for a given product unit. Therefore, we assume
that the fraction of customers boycotting the firm’s product does not depend on the
actual quantity of products sourced from supplier L, but only on whether or not the
buyer sourced from that supplier (i.e., if supplier L is not awarded any business, then
there is no risk of a responsibility violation for the buyer). The buyer’s expected profit
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πRV in this case is as follows:
πRV (QL, QH) = (1− 1(QL > 0)δRV ) pmin {QL +QH , d}+
1(QL > 0)δRV pmin {QL +QH , (1− γRV )d} −QLcL −QHcH ,
(3.2)
where 1(X) is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if X is true and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 3.3 characterizes the profit-maximizing sourcing strategy for a buyer under
RV.
Proposition 3.3. When sourcing from supplier L introduces potential responsibility
violation risk, the profit-maximizing strategy is to sole-source as follows:
(1) Select supplier H and set Q = QH = d when γRV >
c∆




(2) Select supplier L and
(a) set Q = QL = d when γRV >
c∆
p−cL and δRV 6
c∆
γRV p






(b) set Q = QL = (1− γRV )d, otherwise.
Panel (b) of Figure 3.1 illustrates the buyer’s optimal sourcing strategy when faced
with RV. Comparing the two panels in the figure, we see that under both risk types, an
impact threshold separates the high- and low-impact regions, with the threshold under
RV smaller. Within each region, likelihood further determines the buyer’s optimal
sourcing strategies. Supplier H only becomes an active choice when the impact is
high. When the impact is low, supplier L is always optimal, and the order quantity
may deviate from demand d if the likelihood is sufficiently high. The direction of this
deviation differs across the two risk types: the order quantity is set lower than d under
RV to ensure there is no leftover inventory if a responsibility violation occurs, while it
is set higher than d under SD to ensure there is sufficient inventory to meet demand in
case of a supply disruption. Proposition 3.4 further summarizes these insights specific
to RV.
Proposition 3.4. An increase in the likelihood of responsibility violation influences the
buyer’s optimal sourcing strategy as follows:
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(1) Low impact condition (γRV 6
c∆
p−cL ): the buyer always chooses supplier L but the




(2) High impact condition (γRV >
c∆
p−cL ): the buyer switches from supplier L (Q
∗
L = d)





As we see in previous sections, the decision settings for SD and RV differ in multiple
ways, and some of these differences lead to distinctive optimal sourcing strategies under
the two risk types. In forming our behavioral hypotheses regarding how buyers make
sourcing decisions under SD and RV, it is helpful to highlight the major differences
between the decision settings for the two risk types and introduce some additional
terminology. These differences can be organized by dimensions of structure and context,
as summarized in Table 3.1.
Structure defines how the impact of the risky event influences the buyer’s supply
chain. For example, the risky event under SD influences product supply and is limited
to only the focal supplier where the event occurs. We refer to this type of structure as
supply-focal, where supply signifies the domain of the impact and focal denotes its scope.
In contrast, the risky event under RV influences the demand domain and has a broader
scope that crosses over to both suppliers. We refer to this structure as demand-cross.
Context reflects the nature of the risky event itself. Unlike structure, this character-
istic does not alter the optimal sourcing strategy. Instead, it might influence the buyer’s
decisions through the framing effect. Under RV, the risky event involves a violation of
business practices, which might evoke ethical consciousness. This reaction is unlikely
under SD, where the risky event is attributed to a process disruption.





Structure (Domain-Scope) Supply-Focal Demand-Cross
Context Disruption Violation
22
Recall our normative results indicate that sole-sourcing is optimal under both SD
and RV, and the optimal supplier to source from varies based on the likelihood and
impact levels. Based on the characteristics of the decision settings under the two risk
types summarized in Table 3.1, our behavioral hypotheses examine to what extent actual
buyer decisions deviate from these normative predictions. Specifically, we are interested
in exploring: (i) Do buyers diversify? (ii) Do buyers’ supplier preferences differ from
the optimal solution?
3.3.1 Diversification Behavior
Prior research has identified diversification bias as a persistent behavioral phenomenon:
people tend to diversify when multiple options are available to them (see, e.g., Read
and Loewenstein 1995). Behavioral studies related to sourcing decisions often attribute
buyers’ tendency to choose more than one supplier when sole-sourcing is optimal to this
general bias toward diversification (e.g., Gurnani et al. 2014). While we are likely to
observe diversification in our setting as well, the more interesting question is how the
propensity to diversify varies across SD and RV, given the structural and contextual
differences we observe in Table 3.1.
First, we conjecture that the distinctive underlying structures under SD and RV
may require different levels of cognitive processing. In the RV case, the two supply
sources are interrelated, and the influence of violations at supplier L’s site can spill over,
since keeping supplier L in the supply base opens up the prospect of violations and the
resulting loss of demand, regardless of the quantity sourced from that supplier. Reducing
the amount sourced from L, unless completely down to zero, does not help curtail risk
exposure. A sound understanding of this unique structure may help buyers recognize
the “all-or-nothing” nature, pushing them to sole-source from either supplier H (to
eliminate risk) or supplier L (to minimize the total procurement cost while bearing risk).
In contrast, in the SD case, the influence is focal in nature, i.e., disruptions at supplier
L do not influence production and quantity delivered by supplier H. Consequently,
the two supply sources are independent, making the risk exposure proportional to the
actual quantity sourced from supplier L. Given people’s natural tendency to process
information incrementally (e.g., Hogarth and Karelaia 2007), a better understanding
of this linear risk structure, by itself, may not be helpful in pushing buyers under SD
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toward sole-sourcing.
Second, the different contexts under SD and RV are likely to lead to different affective
reactions. Under RV, potential violations might induce moral judgment, since buyers’
decisions have vital implications for the welfare of various stakeholders, including the
supplier’s employees who might be adversely influenced by the practices and customers
who may be concerned about the firm’s environmental and social conduct. Previous
research suggests that moral judgment often involves, and can even be guided by, emo-
tional responses (e.g., Rozin et al. 1999, Haidt 2001), and consequently, we expect the
context of RV to evoke strong affective reactions. Since choosing supplier L under RV
involves moral ambiguity, buyers’ affective responses might prompt them to avoid doing
business with supplier L. However, this aspect is not salient under SD because the in-
fluence of disruptions is purely economic. Hence, the context of SD is unlikely to trigger
ethical judgment that pushes buyers toward avoiding supplier L. Thus, buyers under
SD are more likely to split their orders between the two supplier candidates. Since
forces from both the cognitive and affective aspects point to less diversification under
RV, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3.1. Buyers are less likely to exhibit diversification bias when faced with
the risk of a responsibility violation relative to a supply disruption.
3.3.2 Buyer Preference: Low- vs. High-cost Supplier
We next examine how buyers’ supplier preference may vary across SD and RV, and how
this behavior changes across scenarios where the normative theory identifies supplier
H vs. supplier L as optimal. We are especially interested in the scenarios in which
supplier H is identified as optimal, since it is a “win-win” sourcing strategy under RV:
sole-sourcing from supplier H is not only economically optimal for the buyer, but also
“socially optimal” from a stakeholder perspective.
When sourcing from supplier H is optimal, the influence of cognitive processing and
affective reactions is congruent under RV. From a cognitive perspective, as previously
discussed, a better understanding of the “all-or-nothing” risk that spills across the two
suppliers under RV may help buyers overcome diversification bias and increase the rate
of sole-sourcing. The increased tendency to sole-source also narrows the choice set to
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two alternatives, and we anticipate that this narrowing of the choice set will help buyers
in correctly identifying the optimal supplier under RV relative to SD. From an affective
perspective, buyers under RV might feel that retaining supplier L in the supply base is
not justifiable on moral grounds. On the other hand, exclusively sourcing from supplier
H helps strengthen their commitment to stakeholder welfare. These considerations will
push them toward sole-sourcing from supplier H, especially among individuals who
are more ethically conscious. However, under SD, whether or not to include supplier
H in the mix involves only cost-benefit tradeoff considerations, without any ethical
judgments. As a result, buyers under RV may have a higher propensity to commit to
supplier H. Therefore, we formally hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3.2. When it is optimal to sole-source from supplier H, buyers are more
likely to correctly select the optimal supplier when faced with the risk of a responsibility
violation relative to a supply disruption.
When sourcing from supplier L is optimal, the influence of cognitive processing and
affective reactions is incongruent under RV. From a cognitive perspective, the benefits
resulting from a better understanding of the risk structure may help buyers to narrow
down the choice set to two alternatives, resulting in an increased likelihood of correctly
selecting the optimal supplier (i.e., supplier L) under RV. From an affective perspective,
buyers faced with RV may exhibit a stronger aversion toward sourcing from supplier
L since it involves the possibility of violating business practices and ethical standards
and the low-cost supplier is actively involved and has direct control over the risky event
(Sparanca et al. 1991). Based on the above discussion, we see that the forces from the
cognitive and affective aspects point us in different directions with regard to the buyers’
preferred choice of supplier when faced with RV, and it is not clear which of the two
forces dominate. As a result, we have formulated the following competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3.3A. When it is optimal to sole-source from supplier L, buyers are more
likely to correctly select the optimal supplier when faced with the risk of a responsibility
violation relative to a supply disruption.
Hypothesis 3.3B. When it is optimal to sole-source from supplier L, buyers are less
likely to correctly select the optimal supplier when faced with the risk of a responsibility
violation relative to a supply disruption.
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3.3.3 Influence of the Operating Environment
Having considered the potential for behavioral deviations with respect to diversifica-
tion and supplier selection, we now examine how buyers’ sourcing strategies vary as
the underlying likelihood and impact levels change. From Propositions 3.2 and 3.4,
we observe that the optimal strategy for a profit-maximizing buyer does not change in
a continuous or incremental fashion, and this step-wise nature is not always intuitive.
However, it is well-known from the judgment and decision-making literature that indi-
viduals often use intuition-based heuristics when making decisions (e.g., Tversky and
Kahneman 1974). Furthermore, prior research shows that individuals often process rel-
evant decision cues in an incremental fashion (e.g., Hogarth and Karelaia 2007) and use
linear extrapolations that can substantially deviate from the theoretical predictions in
non-linear systems, such as environments involving exponential growth (e.g., Wagenaar
and Sagaria 1975). Our normative results suggest that the sourcing setting analyzed
in this work is also a non-linear system. As such, we predict that when the likelihood
changes, buyers will adjust their sourcing strategies in an incremental way under the
influence of heuristic reasoning. Specifically, for small changes in likelihood, we postu-
late that buyers will apply minor tweaks to their sourcing strategy rather than making
step-wise adjustments as the optimal strategy suggests. Given our previous argument
that buyers are likely to diversify when faced with either risk type, such minor tweaks
may manifest in the form of incremental adjustments to the orders allocated to the two
suppliers. This behavioral tendency has different implications for scenarios with low vs.
high impact levels. To more concretely construct our hypothesis, we describe likelihood
changes in an increasing direction, but this does not imply that buyers face continuously
increasing likelihood levels in reality or our experiment.
Recall that when the impact is low, the buyer’s profit-maximizing strategy is to
choose supplier L and adjust the order quantity (upward under SD and downward
under RV) if the likelihood of a disruption or violation is above a certain threshold. Our
behavioral prediction is that individuals will allocate more of their orders to supplier H
whenever the likelihood increases, rather than follow the normative strategy of tweaking
the order quantity from L.
On the other hand, when the impact is high, a profit-maximizing buyer needs to
consider different suppliers as the likelihood increases (see the high impact condition
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in Propositions 3.2 and 3.4). Our behavioral prediction is that buyers will react in
an optimal way directionally by sourcing more from supplier H, but they will do so
incrementally rather than switching altogether. In addition, buyers may equate higher
likelihood with higher uncertainty, failing to realize the benefit of exclusively sourcing
from supplier L when the likelihood is high under SD. Synthesizing the above arguments,
we formally hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3.4. Buyers will increase the proportion of orders awarded to supplier
H whenever the likelihood of a supply disruption or responsibility violation increases,
regardless of the impact level.
3.4 Experimental Design
We used a behavioral experiment to test our hypotheses, with participants assuming the
role of a buyer making sourcing decisions within the settings described in section 3.2.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatments corresponding to either
supply disruption or RV. The main task for participants was to decide how much to
order from each of the two suppliers in a series of decision scenarios, with each scenario
varying in terms of the levels of likelihood (δi; three levels: 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75) and
impact (γi; four levels: 0.2, 0.5, 0.7, and 1). Figure 3.2 illustrates how the 12 scenarios
map to normative predictions under each risk type. Every participant made decisions
for all 12 scenarios with two repetitions, and the 24 rounds were presented in a random
sequence. Data from the first repetition were utilized for the main analysis, while data
from the second repetition were used to test the robustness of our results. We fixed
cH = $30, cL = $18, p = $63, and d = 100 throughout the experiment. Our calibrations
of the cost and risk levels are comparable with prior research (e.g., Gurnani et al. 2014).
The experiment was run on the SoPHIE software platform (Hendriks 2012). Screenshots
are provided in the Appendix.
We recruited participants from the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) subject pool,
which has been used in a variety of behavioral studies (e.g., Berinsky et al. 2012),
including behavioral operations (e.g., Lee et al. 2018). Our participants were limited
to MTurk workers in the U.S. who previously completed at least 500 tasks and had an
overall approval rating of at least 95%. In total, 217 MTurk workers (Nmale = 115,
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(b) Responsibility Violation (RV)
Figure 3.2: Mapping of Decision Scenarios to Normative Predictions under SD and RV
Mage = 39.45) completed all of the required activities, with 108 participants randomly
assigned to the SD treatment and the other 109 to the RV treatment. Participants
began by reading instructions, answering a set of quiz questions to make sure they
understood the setting, and completing three practice rounds to familiarize themselves
with the process and interface before proceeding to the main task. After completing
each scenario, participants saw the associated outcome (i.e., whether a supply disruption
or responsibility violation occurred, depending on which treatment they were assigned
to) and corresponding profit. After completing the last scenario, participants answered
a set of survey questions. The final payment consisted of a flat participation fee and a
performance-based payment that was associated with each participant’s average profit
across all rounds of the game. The average payment per participant was $4.07.
3.5 Experimental Results
Before analyzing the data, we removed data points corresponding to participants who
exhibited one of the following outlier behaviors in at least one scenario: (1) set both QL
and QH to zero (i.e., Q = 0), and (2) set Q > 3330, which is more than 10 times the
highest possible optimal order quantity. Applying these exclusion criteria reduced the
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sample size to 107 for the SD treatment and 105 for the RV treatment, removing five
participants in total. The main analysis is based on participant responses from the first
repetition of the 12 decision scenarios, as indicated in the prior section. A robustness
analysis of data from the second repetition confirms the key results of our main analysis.
3.5.1 Diversification Behavior
Before testing Hypothesis 3.1, we first compute the proportion of buyers who diversify
(i.e., source from both suppliers) under each decision scenario. Figure 3.3 reports the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals, with the averages ranging from 40% to 80%.
While some diversification clearly exists in all scenarios, the propensity to diversify
appears to be lower under RV relative to SD.
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Figure 3.3: 95% Confidence Intervals of the Proportion of Buyers Who Diversify
To more rigorously measure the influence of risk type on diversification, we utilize
logistic regressions, with the dependent variable Diversification capturing whether or
not the buyer diversifies. Our primary independent variable of interest, RiskTypeR, is
coded as 1 for the RV treatment and 0 otherwise. We use clustered standard errors at
the participant level throughout our analysis. Table 3.2 reports the results. In Model
2, the coefficient of RiskTypeR is negative and significant (p < 0.001), with the odds of
diversification decreasing by 1−e−0.825 = 56.18% under RV. The corresponding average
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marginal effect is a 17.98 percentage point reduction in the probability of diversification
under RV relative to SD. These results support Hypothesis 3.1.






γi = 0.5 −0.048
(0.087)
γi = 0.7 −0.128
(0.086)
γi = 1 −0.807∗∗∗
(0.104)
δi = 0.5 −0.389∗∗∗
(0.087)





Log Likelihood -1646 -1592
AIC 3297 3199
Note: +p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
3.5.2 Buyer Preference: Low- versus High-cost Supplier
We next examine buyers’ sourcing strategies in terms of how orders are allocated across
the two suppliers. Figure 3.4 contains a set of histograms displaying the mean pro-
portion of orders awarded to supplier H, i.e., QH/Q, under the two risk types. The
top panel corresponds to scenarios in which supplier H is the optimal choice from a
profit-maximizing perspective. The percentages of instances in which buyers choose to
sole-source from supplier H (i.e., align with the optimal policy) are above 40% under
both risk types, with the percentage under RV appearing higher. To rigorously test the
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influence of risk type on buyer behavior, we perform a logistic regression on the likeli-
hood of correct sole-sourcing, with the results reported in Table 3.3. Model 2 indicates
that buyer behavior is significantly different across the two risk types (p < 0.01), with
the odds of committing exclusively to supplier H higher by e0.680 − 1 = 97.38% un-
der RV. The corresponding average marginal effect is a 16.18 percentage point increase
in the probability of correctly sole-sourcing from supplier H under RV relative to SD.




































Figure 3.4: Histograms of the Proportion of Orders Awarded to Supplier H (QH/Q)
The bottom panel of Figure 3.4 illustrates the scenarios in which supplier L is the
optimal choice. From the figure, we see that in less than 20% of the instances, buyers
sole-source from supplier L, and this proportion is quite comparable across the two risk
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types. Model 4 in Table 3.3 confirms that the probability of correctly selecting the
optimal supplier (i.e., supplier L) is indeed similar across the two risk types, since the
coefficient of RiskTypeR is not statistically different from 0. This implies that neither
Hypothesis 3.3A nor Hypothesis 3.3B is supported.
Table 3.3: Logistic Regression Results on Correct Sole-Sourcing
OptSupplier = H OptSupplier = L
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant −0.812∗ −2.660∗∗∗ −2.656∗∗∗ −1.209∗
(0.358) (0.506) (0.443) (0.530)
Round 0.010 0.009
(0.011) (0.016)
γi = 0.5 −1.120∗∗∗
(0.229)
γi = 0.7 −0.021 −1.253∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.226)
γi = 1 0.682
∗∗∗ −1.259∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.365)
δi = 0.5 0.926
∗∗∗ −0.729∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.140)
δi = 0.75 1.161
∗∗∗ −1.216∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.172)
RiskType 0.388+ 0.680∗∗ 0.384 0.010
(0.224) (0.243) (0.280) (0.301)
Observations 1,056 1,056 1,488 1,488
Log Likelihood -724.8 -706 -503.3 -475.1
AIC 1454 1426 1011 966.1
Note: Supplier H is the optimal option only for γi > 0.5. Hence, the
baseline for Model 2 is γi = 0.5 instead of γi = 0.2.
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
3.5.3 Influence of the Operating Environment
Hypothesis 3.4 predicted that buyers will respond to changes in likelihood by incremen-
tally adjusting order allocation between the two suppliers instead of making step-wise
changes, as the normative solution suggests. Figure 3.5 illustrates how buyers adjust
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the proportion of orders awarded to supplier H (i.e., QH/Q) as a function of likelihood
for different impact levels and risk types. From the figure, we see that QH/Q increases
monotonically with likelihood, following either a linear or a concave trend, with higher
impact invoking greater concavity. These general trends do not appear to vary signif-
icantly across the two risk types, and more importantly, there is no evidence of the
step-wise changes predicted by our normative models.
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Figure 3.5: Proportion of Orders Awarded to Supplier H (QH/Q)
To test our hypothesis regarding buyers’ adjustment behavior, we use OLS (ordi-
nary least squares) regression models, with QH/Q as the dependent variable. Table 3.4
summarizes the results. As we see from Models 3 and 6, when likelihood increases from
0.25 to 0.5, the proportion of orders awarded to supplier H increases by 15 percentage
points, with an additional increase of 6 to 7 percentage points as likelihood increases
further from 0.5 to 0.75. This general pattern also holds when we examine the subsam-
ples corresponding to low and high impact levels in Models 1-2 and 4-5. These results
support Hypothesis 3.4.
Another implication of the behavior suggested by Hypothesis 3.4 is that buyers’
sourcing patterns may not be consistent with the interesting strategy that emerged
in our analytical results when likelihood is high (see Propositions 3.2 and 3.4). In a
subset of that region, it is advantageous to stick with supplier L, but the order quantity
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Table 3.4: OLS Regression Results on the Proportion of Orders Awarded to Supplier
H for Different Impact Levels
Supply Disruption Risk Responsibility Violation Risk
Low-Impact High-Impact All Low-Impact High-Impact All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.412∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030)
Round 0.002 0.001 0.002 −0.002 0.003+ 0.003+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
γi = 0.5 0.156
∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
γi = 0.7 0.205
∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029)
γi = 1 0.272
∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.032)
δi = 0.5 0.131
∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.031) (0.024) (0.021)
δi = 0.75 0.211
∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.041) (0.027) (0.026)
Participant Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 642 642 1284 315 945 1260
R2 0.132 0.213 0.270 0.165 0.148 0.202
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.209 0.267 0.157 0.146 0.199
Note: +p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
should be set lower than d when faced with RV and higher than d when faced with SD.
To provide a view of buyers’ actual sourcing behavior in this region, we highlight one
decision scenario (γi = 0.2 and δi = 0.75) where adjusting Q away from d is optimal for
both risk types. Table 3.5 shows that a majority of buyers set Q = d, with more failing
to adjust when faced with RV than when faced with SD (χ2 test, χ2(1) = 15.1020,
p = 0.0001; similar results hold when using Fisher’s Exact Test). Among those who
adjust their order quantity when faced with SD, more appear to do so in the correct
direction (Q > d). A binomial test rigorously confirms this assertion (p < 0.0001). The
few buyers who adjust their order quantities when faced with RV do not consistently
adjust in the correct direction (in this case, Q < d; p = 0.7905). These results suggest
that buyers are generally unaware of the benefit of adjusting Q downward when faced
with RV but might recognize, at least to a certain degree, the benefit of adjusting Q
upward when faced with SD.
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Table 3.5: Buyers’ Order Quantity in the Selected Decision Scenario (γi = 0.2 and
δi = 0.75)
Risk Type N NQ<d NQ=d NQ>d Q < d (%) Q = d (%) Q > d (%)
SD 107 6 68 33 5.6 63.6 30.8
RV 105 6 91 8 5.7 86.7 7.6
3.6 Post-Hoc Analysis of Expected Profit Implications
Our experimental data provide opportunities to investigate how buyers’ actual expected
profits compare relative to normative predictions, which in turn brings to light some
potential improvement strategies. As a benchmark, it is helpful to first examine how
the optimal profit, resulting from the sourcing strategies defined in Propositions 3.1 and
3.3, varies across scenarios. Figure 3.6 illustrates these benchmarks through a series of
dashed lines. Under RV (Panel (b)), optimal profit decreases with the likelihood of a
violation, which is consistent with intuition. In contrast, under SD (Panel (a)), the
optimal profit does not monotonically decrease with likelihood under some scenarios.
For example, as the likelihood of a disruption increases from 0.5 to 0.75, buyers’ optimal
profit increases. This is because in those scenarios, as the likelihood of a disruption
increases beyond a moderate level, the uncertainty faced by the buyer actually decreases.
As such, the buyer can more effectively counteract the likely threat of a supply disruption
by inflating the order quantity, since the chance of overstocking is low at high likelihood
levels.
Buyers’ actual profits, as calculated from our experimental data, are illustrated in
Figure 3.6 through a series of solid lines. From the figure, we see that there is a consid-
erable gap between the normative and actual profits for each scenario, with significantly
larger gaps under RV (26.91% for each participant on average). The percentage gap in
profits under SD is somewhat lower but is still substantial at 14.13%. To obtain a better
understanding of the difference in profit gaps across the two risk types, we plot a set
of histograms in Figure 3.7, displaying the profit gap by risk type. When it is optimal
to sole-source from supplier H (top panel), roughly 20% of the participants’ ordering
behavior is consistent with the optimal strategy under each risk type. However, more
participants incur higher losses under RV, leading to a larger mean gap when compared
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of Optimal and Actual Expected Profits under Different Deci-
sion Scenarios
with the supply disruption case. In contrast, when it is optimal to sole-source from
supplier L (bottom panel), participants have similar profit gaps across the two risk
types. These comparisons indicate that the scenarios where it is optimal to source from
supplier H present particular challenges to buyers faced with the risk of a responsibility
violation. Next, we examine one specific strategy that might help to address this issue.
The horizontal dotted reference line in Figure 3.6 shows the profit (= $3300) if the
buyer always sole-sources from supplier H (the risk-free option) with QH = d. From
the figure, we see that sourcing exclusively from the high-cost supplier is an effective
strategy for the buyer under RV, especially when the likelihood and impact of the risk
are moderate to high. In such settings, sourcing exclusively from supplier H results in
optimal or near-optimal performance. In settings characterized by low likelihood and
impact, sourcing exclusively from supplier H still yields substantial improvements over
the actual sourcing decisions made by participants in our experiments, resulting in a
total profit increase of nearly 52.87%. Under SD, sourcing exclusively from supplier H
outperforms the participants’ sourcing strategies, resulting in an average profit increase
of 14.31%. However, sole-sourcing from supplier H still leads to a 10.92% loss relative
to the optimal profits.
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Mean Loss = 11.08%
Mean Loss = 15.14%
Mean Loss = 34.14%
Mean Loss = 16.78%


































Figure 3.7: Histograms of the Profit Gap between Actual and Optimal (%)
3.7 Discussion and Conclusions
This study presents a comparative framework to evaluate buyers’ sourcing decisions
under different types of supplier-induced risks. Our behavioral theories argue that
the problem strutures and decision contexts are different under the two risk types,
eliciting different cognitive processing and affective reactions, which in turn lead to
different ordering behaviors across SD and RV. We find that buyers’ sourcing decisions
do differ under supply disruption versus RV in terms of the extent of diversification and
the probability of selecting the optimal supplier. Although many buyers diversify, in
contrast to the normative recommendation of sole-sourcing, we find that buyers diversify
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less when faced with RV relative to SD. Furthermore, buyers under RV are more likely
to sole-source from the profit-maximizing supplier when that supplier is the less risky
option.
Our normative results in Propositions 3.2 and 3.4 indicate that when the likelihood
of a disruption or violation increases, buyers may find it advantageous to change total
order quantities as well as their supply source. In our experiment, we observe that
buyers adjust total order quantities differently across the two risk types. Specifically,
buyers facing RV are more likely to anchor their order quantity on demand and fail
to realize that adjusting their order quantity downward may be an effective strategy
to avoid overstocking. In contrast, a larger proportion of buyers facing SD seem to
recognize that adjusting the total order quantity upward may be an effective strategy
to combat the possibility of understocking. Future research could investigate whether
such difficulty in making downward adjustments in sourcing decisions is connected with
managers’ similar behavior in other operations management domains such as inventory
management (e.g., Zhang and Siemsen 2019).
Although buyers set total order quantities in different ways, their adjustments in
order allocation to the two suppliers do not vary significantly across the two risk types
when the operating environment changes. This pattern implies that buyers may be us-
ing a general heuristics-based approach when evaluating cost-risk tradeoffs, even though
the underlying risks are fundamentally different in nature. This empirical observation
deserves greater attention, since risk management tactics that are useful in tackling SD
may be less effective (or even detrimental) in addressing RV. Based on a normative per-
spective, Guo et al. (2016) urge buyers to reevaluate their sourcing strategies when the
nature of the risk changes. Our study further underscores the importance of developing
a risk-type-specific sourcing strategy from a behavioral perspective.
In terms of expected profit, our analysis reveals that buyers leave more on the
table when faced with RV, especially in scenarios where sole-sourcing from the high-
cost supplier is the optimal strategy. This finding is striking, because buyers under
RV sole-source more and have a higher tendency to select the high-cost supplier. A
closer look at the distribution of the profit gaps in these scenarios reveals that buyers
who dual-source incur larger losses more frequently under RV. This result suggests that
one effective approach to narrowing the overall performance gap for buyers facing RV
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might be to commit to sole-sourcing from the high-cost supplier and not engage in
dual-sourcing under such scenarios.
Our study has limitations that may serve as avenues for future work. First, our
parsimonious setup, with the potential supply base consisting of one risky supplier and
one risk-free supplier, allows for a clean comparison across the two risk types. However,
researchers may find it worthwhile to explore sourcing behavior in more complex settings
involving other combinations of risk profiles, such as when sourcing from either supplier
introduces some risk or when either likelihood or impact information is unavailable (i.e.,
uncertainties). Second, our research focuses on investigating supplier selection and order
quantity decisions, which could serve as a building block for future research related to
other strategic decisions, such as mitigation or contingency plans made by buyers to
address different supplier-induced risks (e.g., Tomlin 2006, Speier et al. 2011).
Chapter 4
Study 2: Supply Disruption vs.
Responsibility Violation Risks:
The Influence of Structure and
Context
4.1 Introduction
Study 1 revealed that participants’ ordering behaviors under supply disruption risk (SD)
and responsibility violation risk (RV) are significantly different. In this study, we aim
to delve deeper into the characteristics of decision settings of the two risk types and
disentangle the effects of risk structure (i.e., whether a risk influences the supply or
demand side of the supply chain, and whether the influence is focal to the impacted
supplier or crosses over to the supply base) and context (i.e., whether the risky event is
a process disruption or business practice violation). We introduce three new treatments
for our behavioral experiments based on our risk taxonomy in Study 1. Comparing these
new treatments against the two main treatments allows us to better understand the
underlying driving forces and evaluate their relative importance in influencing buyers’
sourcing decisions.
Another important goal of this study is to replicate the results of Study 1 using a
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different participant pool with management experience to explore the potential influence
of management experience. In addition, we carefully modified our experimental design
to reduce potential difficulties, including providing an optional decision-support tool to
help calculate profit with different order quantities under consideration. We address the
following research questions: (1) Are the main insights revealed in Study 1 robust to
managerial experience and the assistance of decision support? (2) What structure and
context characteristics drive buyers’ ordering behavior? (3) How do buyers’ sourcing
strategies influence their profit performance?
Our experimental results reveal that the behavioral pattern we observe in Study
1 with respect to the differences under SD and RV also appears after we switch to a
participant pool with managerial experience. In addition, a considerable portion of the
differences between buyers’ ordering behavior under SD and RV can be attributed to
their different risk structures, especially their scope (i.e., whether the influence is focal
to the low-cost supplier only or crosses over to the high-cost supplier). When facing
a risk with cross-supplier influence, participants diversify less and are more likely to
correctly sole-source from the high-cost supplier. In contrast, risk context plays a more
limited role. Furthermore, our analysis of the influence of buyers’ sourcing strategies
on expected profit confirms that diversification reduces profit performance under both
risk types. When considering which one of the two supplier candidates to sole-source
from, buyers will be better off if they err on the side of sole-sourcing from the high-
cost supplier. Individual differences related to cognitive and affective influence are also
explored.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 4.2, we describe
the experimental design of Study 2. In section 4.3, we discuss the replication results
regarding buyers’ sourcing strategies under SD and RV. To further disentangle the
differences between the two risk types, we assess the effects of structure and context
in section 4.4. We continue our analysis in section 4.5 by examining the performance
implications of different sourcing strategies and identify potential individual attributes
that are associated with buyers’ strategy adoption. Finally, in section 4.6, we conclude
with a discussion of the research implications, highlighting theoretical and managerial
contributions and identifying possible future research directions.
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4.2 Experimental Design
In this section, we begin by describing how the overall experimental design of Study 2
compares with that of Study 1. Next, we provide detailed information on how we design
the treatments to help us replicate the results in Study 1 and further disentangle the
effects of structure and context characteristics.
4.2.1 Changes in Experimental Design Relative to Study 1
The sourcing task and decision scenarios (i.e., the within-subject treatments of likelihood
and impact levels) in this study follow our design in Study 1. However, there are three
key differences.
First, we used a different participant pool. We recruited participants from the
Prolific platform (Palan and Schitter 2018), which has been used in behavioral studies
in a variety of fields, including supply chain management (e.g., DuHadway et al. 2018).
In addition to the requirement of living in the U.S. and having completed at least
500 studies with an overall approval rate of at least 95%, we included one additional
screening criterion to limit participants to those who have management experience.
Second, we modified several elements of our experimental design to further im-
prove participants’ understanding of the task environment and increase their incentives.
Importantly, we added an optional decision-support tool for participants to calculate
sales quantity and profit outcomes of order quantities under consideration to facilitate
decision-making. In addition, we made a series of minor adjustments. Specifically, we
updated the quiz questions to improve clarity; we increased the number of practice
rounds from three to five to allow participants more time to familiarize themselves with
the task; we reduced the number of rounds of the sourcing task from 24 to 12 (i.e., from
2 repetitions to 1 repetition) to reduce potential fatigue and dilution of incentives.
Third, our experimental research involves a total of five treatments, with participants
randomly assigned to only one of them. These five treatments include the SD and
RV treatments from Study 1 and three additional treatments designed to disentangle
structure and context characteristics, which we detail below.
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4.2.2 Design of Treatments
The results from Study 1 demonstrate that participants’ ordering behaviors under
SD and RV are significantly different with respect to diversification and correct sole-
sourcing. To better understand the driving forces behind these results, we return to
the fundamental differences between the two risk types that informed our behavioral
hypotheses. We conjectured that buyers facing RV would resort to different levels of
diversification and correct sole-sourcing for two reasons. First, under RV, the risk struc-
ture has a broader scope, crossing over to both suppliers. This crossover effect leads to
an “all-or-nothing” nature, which may propel buyers to sole-source from H to eliminate
risk or sole-source from L to minimize cost. Second, RV presents a context under which
buyers face the prospect of violating business practices, which may trigger more affec-
tive responses. Consequently, buyers are likely to have a higher tendency to avoid doing
business with L because of moral ambiguity. In this study, we disentangle the effects of
structure (i.e., domain and scope) and context using three additional treatments that
involve a systematic variation of these characteristics. These treatments were designed
with careful consideration of their practical relevance, in addition to their ability to al-
low us to better understand the underlying driving forces and their relative importance
in terms of influencing buyers’ sourcing strategies.
As stated above, in Study 2, we introduce three additional treatments corresponding
to supplier-induced risks that involve different combinations of structural and contextual
characteristics. The three risk treatments are summarized and compared with SD and
RV in Table 4.1. We discuss each of them in detail below.



















Reputation damage due to
other products’ quality problems
Labor regulation
violation
Number of Participants 102 112 109 103 105
Structure (Domain-Scope) Supply-Focal Supply-Focal Supply-Cross Demand-Cross Demand-Cross
Context Disruption Violation Disruption Disruption Violation
Note. Each risk type’s acronym indicates the characteristics of its decision setting, with the first letter reflecting its structure and the second its
context. Structure: S = Supply-Focal; C = Supply-Cross; R = Demand-Cross. Context: D = Disruption; V = Violation.
A safety violation (SV) occurs when a supplier does not comply with government-
established safety protocols. If such a violation occurs and is detected during a safety
audit, production will need to be shut down to carry out remedial activities, resulting in
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a reduction in supply quantity from that supplier. Note that this risk type also involves
violations of business practices similar to RV, but its structure is similar to SD: the
influence manifests on the supply side and is focal to the low-cost supplier. Since SD
and SV share the same structure, the buyer’s optimal sourcing strategy is the same
under SD and SV, as shown in Figure 4.1(a).
A reputation disruption (RD) arises when a supplier’s negative quality reputation
harms customers’ perception of the product the buyer sells. The following is an example
of such as scenario: suppose the low-cost supplier also manufactures other products of
lower quality in addition to the product sourced by the buying firm, and there is a
possibility of a quality issue occurring with one of the other products. If such an
issue occurs and the news becomes public, it could, by association, harm customers’
perceptions of the buying firm, resulting in reduced customer demand, regardless of the
product source. Notice that RD involves a process disruption similar to SD but carries
the same risk structure as RV in that the impact shows up on the demand side and
crosses over to both suppliers. Since RV and RD share the same structure, the buyer’s
optimal sourcing strategy is the same under RV and RD, as illustrated in Figure 4.1(c).
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Figure 4.1: Buyer’s Optimal Sourcing Strategy under Three Additional Risk Types
Finally, contamination disruption (CD) refers to cases in which products sourced
from a supplier may lead to contamination incidents, reducing the total quantity of
products available for sale. For example, sourcing from a low-cost supplier that has un-
reliable shipping and handling processes might result in product contamination, which
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can further contaminate the buyer’s warehouse. If such a contamination occurs, a frac-
tion of all products, regardless of the supplier, will not be suitable to sell to customers.
Note that this risk structure provides an ideal middle point of comparison between the
risk structures associated with SD and RD (i.e., supply-focal and demand-cross) because
the influence domain is the supply side, similar to SD, but its cross-supplier scope is
similar to RD.1
Since this additional risk type presents a novel structure that is not seen in SD or
RV, we first establish a normative benchmark, as we did for SD and RV. Figure 4.1(b)
illustrates how the buyer’s optimal sourcing strategy varies based on the likelihood (δCD)
and impact (γCD) of a contamination disruption (a detailed analysis can be found in
the Appendix). Comparing across subfigures in Figure 4.1, we have a clearer view of
how different structures influence the buyer’s optimal sourcing strategy. As we see,
when the impact is lower than a certain threshold (γCD 6
c∆
cH
), the optimal sourcing
strategy under supply-cross structure is similar to that under supply-focal structure.
Specifically, supplier L remains the dominant choice, while the optimal order quantity




), the optimal sourcing strategy under supply-cross structure resembles that
under demand-cross structure. The optimal order quantity always equals d, but the
optimal supplier to source from varies with the likelihood level.
Before concluding our discussion of the additional treatments, we note that SD, SV,
RD, and RV constitute a parsimonious 2 (Structure: supply-focal vs. demand-cross)
by 2 (Context: disruption vs. violation) factorial design to disentangle the effects of
structural and contextual characteristics. In addition, SD-CD-RD forms a pivot design
to isolate the influence of the two dimensions of structure (i.e., domain and scope).
We sought to recruit at least 100 participants for each treatment. In total, 531
participants (57.1% male; Mage = 43.4) completed all of the required activities (their
assignment to each treatment is shown in Table 4.1). The final payment consisted of a
flat participation fee of $3.25 and a bonus payment based on the average profit across
1 Besides parsimony considerations, we did not adopt a full-factorial design to include the demand-
focal combination because we believe it is less realistic in practice. Even when provided with tracing
technologies, customers may still be skeptical about the available information or even be infuriated
by the firm’s double standards. As a result, such damage control tactics may increase mistrust and
perceived insincerity, which will sabotage the firm’s overall business.
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all rounds of the game, with a conversion rate of $900 in the game = $1 bonus. The
average participant payment was $7.12.
4.3 Comparison between Supply Disruption and Respon-
sibility Violation Risks
In this section, we focus on the two main treatments corresponding to SD and RV to
test the robustness of our results with the new participant pool. In the next section,
we report on the three additional treatments designed to explore the underlying driving
forces. Before analyzing the data, we remove data points corresponding to participants
who exhibited the following outlier behaviors in at least one round: (1) set both QL
and QH to zero (i.e., Q = 0), or (2) set Q > 1665, which is more than five times the
highest possible optimal order quantity.2 Two participants met this exclusion criterion,
reducing the number of participants in the SD treatment from 102 to 100.
4.3.1 Diversification Behavior
We start by computing the proportion of buyers who diversify under each decision sce-
nario. Figure 4.2 reports the corresponding 95% confidence intervals, with the averages
ranging from 10% to nearly 80%. Similar to the pattern we observe in Study 1, the
propensity to diversify appears to be lower under RV when compared with SD.
We still utilize logistic regressions to test Hypothesis 3.1, with the dependent variable
Diversification capturing whether or not the buyer diversifies. Our primary indepen-
dent variable of interest, RiskType, is coded as 1 for the RV treatment and 0 otherwise.
Table 4.2 reports the results. In Model 1 (i.e., Column “Diversification All”), the coeffi-
cient of RiskType is negative and significant (p < 0.001), with the odds of diversification
decreasing by 1− e−1.825 = 83.88% under RV. The corresponding average marginal ef-
fect is a 40.6 percentage point reduction in the probability of diversification under RV
relative to SD. This result supports Hypothesis 3.1.
2Our conclusions do not change when using a higher threshold of Q > 3300, which is more than 10
times the highest possible optimal order quantity, to determine outliers.
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Figure 4.2: 95% Confidence Intervals of the Proportion of Buyers Who Diversify
4.3.2 Buyer Preference: Low- vs. High-cost Supplier
We continue to examine how buyers allocate orders across the two suppliers. Figure 4.3
displays a set of histograms of the proportion of orders awarded to supplier H under the
two risk types. The top panel corresponds to scenarios in which supplier H is the profit-
maximizing choice. A KolmogorovSmirnov test shows that the distributions of QH/Q
under the two risk types are different (p < 0.001), with significantly less diversification
under RV (logit regression, p < 0.001). Furthermore, the percentage of instances in
which buyers choose to sole-source from supplier H (i.e., align with the optimal policy)
appears to be substantially different under the two risk types, with around 40% under
SD and nearly 80% under RV. To test the influence of risk type on buyers’ sourcing
strategies, we perform a set of logistic regressions on the likelihood of correct sole-
sourcing. The results are reported in Table 4.2. Model 2 indicates that buyers’ sourcing
strategies are significantly different across the two risk types (p < 0.001), with the odds
of sourcing exclusively from supplier H higher by e1.922 − 1 = 583% under RV. The
corresponding average marginal effect represents a 41.1 percentage point increase in the
probability of sole-sourcing from H (i.e., aligning with the optimal policy) under RV
when compared with SD. This result provides support for Hypothesis 3.2.
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Table 4.2: Logistic Regression Results on Diversification and Correct Sole-sourcing
 Diversification Correct Sole-sourcing 
 All OptSupplier = H OptSupplier = L 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.867*** -2.418*** -0.657 
 (0.436) (0.625) (0.557) 
Round -0.012 0.043* 0.016 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.022) 
Male -0.103 -0.151 0.894** 
 (0.233) (0.276) (0.283) 
Age -0.008 0.010 -0.017 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 






Impact 0.7 -0.481*** 0.445** -1.634*** 
 (0.111) (0.162) (0.248) 
Impact 1 -0.862*** 0.785*** -1.598*** 
 (0.121) (0.162) (0.303) 
Likelihood 0.5 -0.372*** 0.640** -0.472*** 
 (0.081) (0.210) (0.119) 
Likelihood 0.75 -0.738*** 1.226*** -0.829*** 
 (0.103) (0.238) (0.160) 
RiskType -1.817*** 1.935*** 0.093 
 (0.235) (0.287) (0.279) 
Observations 2,460 1,035 1,425 
Log Likelihood -1428 -564.8 -566.1 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2876 1148 1152 
Note: +: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 
 
The bottom panel of Figure 4.3 illustrates the scenarios in which supplier L is the
profit-maximizing choice. From the figure, we see that buyers sole-source from supplier
L roughly 20% of the time, and this proportion is comparable across the two risk types.
Model 3 in Table 4.2 confirms that the probability of sole-sourcing from supplier L (i.e.,
aligning with the optimal policy) is indeed similar across the two risk types, as the







































Figure 4.3: Histograms of the Proportion of Orders Awarded to Supplier H (QH/Q)
Hypothesis 3.3A nor Hypothesis 3.3B is supported. Note that this result is not driven
by similarities in the level of diversification across the two risk types, since there is less
diversification under RV (logit regression, p < 0.001). Instead, it appears that buyers
who choose to not diversify under RV gravitate toward the high-cost supplier. As a
result, we do not see significant differences across the two risk types with respect to
participants’ propensity to sole-source from the low-cost supplier. Overall, the results
of this subsection suggest that there is lower diversification under RV and, furthermore,
participants who choose not to diversify gravitate toward the high-cost supplier.
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4.3.3 Influence of the Operating Environment
Hypothesis 3.4 predicted that buyers would respond to changes in likelihood by in-
crementally adjusting order allocation between the two suppliers instead of making
step-wise changes, as the normative solution suggests. Figure 4.4 illustrates how buyers
adjust the proportion of orders awarded to supplier H (i.e., QH/Q) as a function of like-
lihood under different impact levels and risk types. From the figure, we see that QH/Q
increases monotonically with likelihood, following either a linear or a concave trend.
These general trends are consistent across the two risk types, and more importantly,
there is no evidence of the step-wise changes predicted by our normative models.
Supply Disruption (SD) Responsibility Violation (RV)
































Figure 4.4: Proportion of Orders Awarded to Supplier H (QH/Q)
To formally test our hypothesis regarding buyers’ behavior, we use OLS (ordinary
least squares) regression models, with QH/Q as the dependent variable. Table 4.3
summarizes the results. As we see from Models 3 and 6, when likelihood increases from
0.25 to 0.5, the proportion of orders awarded to supplier H increases by 15 percentage
points, with an additional increase of 5 percentage points as likelihood increases further
from 0.5 to 0.75. This general pattern also holds when we examine the subsamples
corresponding to low and high impact levels in Models 1-2 and 4-5. These results
support Hypothesis 3.4.
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression Results on the Proportion of Orders Awarded to Supplier
H for Different Impact Levels (SD and RV)













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0.442*** 0.661*** 0.360*** 0.493*** 0.755*** 0.472*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.028) (0.045) (0.020) (0.031) 
Round -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011+ 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Impact 0.5   0.174***   0.236*** 
   (0.029)   (0.032) 
Impact 0.7   0.251***   0.315*** 
   (0.034)   (0.033) 
Impact 1   0.332***   0.331*** 
   (0.032)   (0.033) 
Likelihood 0.5 0.147*** 0.140*** 0.144*** 0.188*** 0.134*** 0.147*** 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.019) (0.036) (0.024) (0.022) 
Likelihood 0.75 0.230*** 0.179*** 0.205*** 0.276*** 0.178*** 0.203*** 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.041) (0.026) (0.025) 
Participant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 600 600 1200 315 945 1260 
R-squared 0.133 0.132 0.287 0.230 0.135 0.300 
Adjusted R-squared 0.128 0.128 0.283 0.223 0.132 0.297 
Note: +: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 
4.4 Disentangling Structure and Context
In this section, we utilize data from all five treatments to revisit our behavioral theories
that support Hypotheses 3.1 through 3.3. If our behavioral theories hold, we should
expect buyers’ ordering patterns to be consistent with the directional predictions from
our hypotheses. Before analyzing the data, we applied the same exclusion criteria as
in section 4.3, reducing the sample size to 112 for the SV treatment, 102 for the RD
treatment, and 107 for the CD treatment.
4.4.1 Assessing the Effect of Structure
We first examine the effect of structure (i.e., domain and scope) on buyers’ ordering
behavior. Specifically, we compare buyers’ ordering decisions across supply-focal vs.
demand-cross structures while holding the context fixed (either violation or disruption).
If structure is an important driver, we would expect buyers facing the demand-cross
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structure to diversify less frequently and correctly sole-source more often, as the ar-
guments leading up to our hypotheses predict. When the risks involve violations (i.e.,
SV-RV comparison), buyers diversify less and are more likely to correctly sole-source
when the optimal supplier is H (ps< 0.05) under RV relative to SV. In scenarios in
which the optimal supplier is L, we do not detect any difference in correct sole-sourcing
between RV and SV (p > 0.1), but the distributions of QH/Q are significantly different
(KolmogorovSmirnov test, p < 0.001). We observe a similar pattern when comparing
the risks that involve disruptions (i.e., SD-RD comparison). Therefore, these two sets
of comparisons produce consistent results as in the SD-RV comparison in section 4.3,
upholding H3.1 and H3.2 but neither H3.3A nor H3.3B.
While general support for H3.1 and H3.2 is expected, the universal rejection of H3.3A
and H3.3B is not. Recall that in our hypothesis development, the pair of competing
hypotheses regarding buyers’ correct sole-sourcing behavior when the optimal supplier
is L (i.e., H3.3A and H3.3B) resulted from incongruent forces of cognitive processing
and affective reactions that point in opposite directions under such scenarios. When
comparing SV and RV in Study 2, we expect to observe and indeed find the same
result for H3.3A and H3.3B as in the prior SD-RV comparison, since the incongruence
between cognitive processing and affective reactions is still present. However, this should
not be the case when comparing SD and RD. Since these two risk types do not involve
violations, the potential influence of affective responses is minimized. As a result, we
should expect the effect of cognitive processing to dominate and H3.3A to hold in the SD-
RD comparison (i.e., more correct sole-sourcing under the demand-cross structure vs.
supply-focal structure). However, our finding is unexpectedly consistent with the prior
SD-RV comparison. Taken together, these results suggest that our behavioral theories
regarding the influence of structure largely hold true, and that a considerable portion
of the differences between SD and RV can be attributed to their different structures.
Nevertheless, buyers face unique challenges when the optimal supplier is L. In this case,
even when the influence of affective reactions is supposed to be limited (as in the SD-RD
comparison), it appears that buyers are not able to overcome their aversion to sourcing
entirely from supplier L. This aversion could negate the benefits of cognitive processing
that might point in the direction of supplier L, resulting in no significant differences in
sourcing behavior between the two risk types when the optimal supplier is L.
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With the help of the novel risk structure introduced by CD, we can further assess
the relative influence of the domain and scope dimensions parsimoniously through the
SD-CD-RD comparison. The SD-CD comparison helps isolate the effect of scope, while
the CD-RD comparison helps isolate the influence of domain. If we observe greater
differences in the SD-CD comparison but less in the CD-RD comparison (or vice versa),
then we can credit more weight to one dimension vs. the other with respect to the
relative influence over buyers’ sourcing strategies.
When comparing SD vs. CD, we observe that participants under CD diversify less
(p < 0.001) and are more likely to sole-source from the optimal supplier when the op-
timal option is H (p < 0.001). When the optimal option is L, there is no significant
difference in correct sole-sourcing (p > 0.1), but the distributions of QH/Q are dif-
ferent (KolmogorovSmirnov test, p < 0.001). These results resemble the pattern we
previously observed when examining the differences between SD and RD. In comparing
CD vs. RD, we find that participants under the two risk types have different levels of
diversification, with buyers under RD diversifying more (p = 0.041). There is no sig-
nificant difference with regard to correct sole-sourcing in either of the two subsamples
with different optimal supplier scenarios (ps > 0.1). In addition, KolmogorovSmirnov
tests on these two subsamples reveal that the distributions of QH/Q under the two risk
types only differ from each other with borderline statistical significance (p = 0.049 when
L is optimal; p = 0.066 when H is optimal). Therefore, when examining the influence
of the structure, it appears that the scope dimension plays a more important role than
the domain dimension in determining buyers’ overall sourcing behavior.
4.4.2 Assessing the Effect of Context
We now turn our attention to the effect of context—the other critical characteristic that
differentiates SD and RV. Specifically, we compare buyers’ ordering decisions across risk
types involving different contexts, i.e., when the risk involves a disruption vs. a violation,
under the same risk structure (either supply-focal or demand-cross). If context matters,
then we would expect that buyers making sourcing decisions in settings involving the
prospect of a violation (vs. a disruption) to diversify less and more likely to sole-source
from H.
Starting with the RD-RV comparison, we find that participants under RV exhibit
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significantly less diversification behavior (p = 0.0336) than those under RD. But there
is no difference across the two risk types with respect to correct sole-sourcing (ps> 0.1).
The distributions of QH/Q are significantly different when the optimal supplier is L
(KolmogorovSmirnov test, p = 0.034), a situation that creates tension between cognitive
processing and affective reactions, but not when the optimal supplier is H (p > 0.1). On
the other hand, in the SD-SV comparison, we do not observe any significant difference
concerning the main dependent variables (diversification and correct sole-sourcing for
the two subsamples with different optimal suppliers, ps> 0.1), and the distributions of
QH/Q are only marginally significantly different (KolmogorovSmirnov tests, 0.05 < ps
< 0.1). Because it is only under the demand-cross structure that we observe significant
differences in buyers’ diversification behavior and detect significant differences in QH/Q
distributions, it appears that the influence of context is more salient when the impact
manifests on the demand side and crosses over to the high-cost supplier. This may be
attributable to the fact that customer boycotts and high stakes magnify the salience of
emotional responses.
4.4.3 Assessing the Robustness of Order Allocation Adjustment Be-
havior
When comparing buyers’ sourcing behaviors under SD and RV in Study 1, we observe
not only prominent differences in ordering patterns, but also notable similarities in or-
der allocations when likelihood levels change. Specifically, we find that buyers allocate
more orders to the high-cost supplier in an incremental way whenever the likelihood in-
creases, providing evidence to support H3.4. In this section, we examine the robustness
of this result using the three additional treatments introduced in Study 2. Table 4.4
summarizes the OLS regression results on QH/Q. As we see, regardless of the struc-
ture and context combinations, buyers award more orders to H when the likelihood is
higher. Therefore, the incremental manner in which buyers adjust order allocations as
the likelihood changes is robust across different risk types.
To summarize the findings from this section, we see that structure and context
characteristics both contribute to buyers’ different sourcing behaviors across SD vs.
RV, but their relative significance varies. In terms of diversification, both dimensions of
structure characteristics (i.e., domain and scope) matter, regardless of context. Buyers
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression Results on the Proportion of Orders Awarded to Supplier
H for Different Impact Levels (SV, CD, and RD)



















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 0.495*** 0.677*** 0.384*** 0.507*** 0.805*** 0.534*** 0.494*** 0.750*** 0.472*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.041) (0.018) (0.027) (0.031) (0.020) (0.032) 
Round -0.006* -0.003 -0.003 -0.009+ -0.004+ -0.006** -0.006 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Impact = 0.5   0.171***   0.242***   0.219*** 
   (0.023)   (0.032)   (0.029) 
Impact = 0.7   0.260***   0.273***   0.278*** 
   (0.028)   (0.034)   (0.033) 
Impact = 1   0.338***   0.300***   0.312*** 
   (0.032)   (0.034)   (0.034) 
Likelihood = 0.5 0.152*** 0.180*** 0.167*** 0.207*** 0.137*** 0.155*** 0.159*** 0.125*** 0.135*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.035) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.019) (0.017) 
Likelihood = 0.75 0.214*** 0.225*** 0.220*** 0.281*** 0.172*** 0.200*** 0.263*** 0.173*** 0.196*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.038) (0.024) (0.022) (0.036) (0.023) (0.022) 
Participant FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 672 672 1344 321 963 1284 306 918 1224 
R-squared 0.145 0.219 0.333 0.248 0.135 0.270 0.284 0.135 0.298 
Adjusted R-squared 0.141 0.215 0.330 0.241 0.133 0.267 0.277 0.133 0.295 
Note: +: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 
are less likely to diversify when the risk event influences the demand side of the supply
chain or when it influences both H and L (vs. only L). In contrast, context only
matters under the demand-cross structure. In such cases, buyers diversify less when the
risk involves a violation (vs. a disruption). In terms of correct sole-sourcing, only the
scope dimension matters. When the impact is pervasive and influences both suppliers,
buyers are more likely to correctly sole-source when the optimal supplier is H. None of
the structure and context characteristics appear to significantly influence correct sole-
sourcing when the optimal supplier is L. Therefore, structure, especially the scope of
the risky event’s impact, primarily explains the differences we observe between SD and
RV, while context plays a less critical role.
4.5 Performance Implications
After comparing buyers’ sourcing behaviors under SD vs. RV and disentangling the
effect of the structural and contextual characteristics, we move one step further to
evaluate the performance implications of buyers’ sourcing strategies. This evaluation
not only helps generate valuable managerial insights to guide sourcing decisions under
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SD and RV, but also brings to light some potential improvement programs generaliz-
able to other risk types with comparable characteristics. Our analysis within each risk
type focuses on how buyers’ sourcing strategies influence their Expected Profit Ratio
(EPR), an efficiency measure defined as the actual expected profit divided by the opti-




H). A higher EPR
indicates better performance.
Figure 4.5 exhibits buyers’ average EPR across different likelihood and impact levels
under each of the five risk types. We see that the influence of risk structure and context
on buyers’ sourcing decisions, as highlighted in section 4.4, is also evident in the EPR.
Across the three types of risk structures, it is clear that the SD-SV group has similar
increasing trends as the impact rises, exhibiting great variation across different scenarios.
The patterns of the RD-RV group, on the other hand, are relatively stable in a confined
band. CD is somewhere in between, such that there is considerable variation in the
low-impact region but not in the high-impact region. Context seems to matter too,
but only in the RD-RV group. Specifically, RV exhibits a higher EPR level relative to
RD across different scenarios. In addition to the two observations that echo our prior
findings, we also notice that buyers under SD and RV exhibit different performances as
impact levels vary. In the low-impact region, buyers under RV perform better, while in
the high-impact region, buyers under SD perform better.
Although these patterns display buyers’ average performances across different sce-
narios, we do not yet know how buyers’ performances vary according to their sourcing
decisions. Only through a better understanding of the performance implications of
different sourcing strategies within each risk type can we provide actionable insights to
guide buyers’ decisions under a specific risk. Therefore, based on our behavioral findings
for SD and RV, we investigate how diversification and a preference for the high-cost sup-
plier may influence buyers’ EPR, and what individual characteristics may be associated
with the adoption of these strategies.
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Figure 4.5: Average EPR across Different Risk Types
4.5.1 How Much Does Diversification Bias Cost?
Although our normative models demonstrate that sole-sourcing is optimal regardless
of the risk type, we observe considerable heterogeneity in buyers’ tendency to diversify
in our behavioral experiments. Hence, we seek to understand how much diversifica-
tion bias costs buyers, and whether overcoming such bias would help to improve their
performance.
We utilize a set of OLS regressions on EPR to investigate this question. In our
regression models, the independent variable of interest is Diversification, a binary
variable indicating whether or not a buyer diversifies in one round, which we used as
the dependent variable to test H3.1 in section 4.3. The regression results are summarized
in Table 4.5. As we see, diversification negatively influences performance under both SD
and RV, and the detrimental effect is more prominent under RV, where diversification
decreases EPR by 36.1 percentage points, on average.
Given that diversification negatively influences performance, we are interested in
obtaining a sense of the persistency of buyers’ strategies, specifically in terms of how
consistently buyers diversify or sole-source across the 12 rounds. We classify buyers into
three general groups: Diversifier (who always dual-sources), SoleSourcer (who always
sole-sources), and Explorer (who engages in both dual-sourcing and sole-sourcing). Ta-
ble 4.6 lists the breakdown of each group under SD and RV. As we see, the proportion
of Explorers is very similar across the two risk types. What differentiates the two risk
types is the relative composition of the other two groups—there are significantly fewer
Diversifiers under RV (less than 6%) compared with SD (more than 30%). Our results
in section 4.3 indicate that buyers under RV diversify less on average, supporting H3.1.
This new analysis provides additional evidence that this behavior also manifests in the
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Table 4.5: Influence of Diversification on EPR
 SD RV 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 0.907*** 1.039*** 
 (0.014) (0.025) 
Round 0.001 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Impact 0.5 0.021** -0.024* 
 (0.007) (0.012) 
Impact 0.7 0.070*** -0.048** 
 (0.007) (0.017) 
Impact 1 0.088*** -0.083** 
 (0.010) (0.027) 
Likelihood 0.5 -0.005 -0.061*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) 
Likelihood 0.75 -0.072*** -0.087*** 
 (0.008) (0.019) 
Diversification -0.065*** -0.361*** 
 (0.009) (0.028) 
Observations 1,200 1,260 
R2 0.250 0.451 
Adjusted R2 0.245 0.448 
Note: +: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 
 
persistency of buyers’ sourcing strategies such that very few buyers always diversify
under RV, while many do so under SD.
Table 4.6: Consistency of Sourcing Strategy (Diversification vs. Sole-sourcing)
Risk Type Diversifier Explorer SoleSourcer
SD 30.7 57.4 11.9
RV 5.7 51.4 42.9
4.5.2 How Much Does Favoring the High-cost Supplier Cost?
Our analysis clearly shows that diversification hurts performance and that buyers should
consider sole-sourcing to improve EPR. The next natural question is how to choose
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between the two options of sole-sourcing from H vs. L. When we examined buyers’
preference for these two supplier candidates in our behavioral experiments, one striking
finding was that participants gravitated toward H more often, even in scenarios when
it was optimal to sole-source from L. Given buyers’ tendency to favor H, we seek
to examine the performance implication of sole-sourcing from H across scenarios with
different optimal suppliers.
Similar to the previous subsection, we utilize a set of OLS regressions to investigate
how different sourcing strategies influence EPR. In our regression models, diversification
is the omitted reference group, and we further divide sole-sourcing into two categories:
H sole-sourcing (H-Sole = 1) and L sole-sourcing (L-Sole = 1). The results are sum-
marized in Table 4.7 by different optimal supplier scenarios. Under RV, H sole-sourcing
is always better than diversification. When H is the optimal supplier (Model 2), this im-
provement is substantial (64.7 percentage points); even when L is the optimal supplier
(Model 4), H sole-sourcing still improves EPR by nearly 9 percentage points relative to
diversification. Under SD, H sole-sourcing leads to strong performance outcomes com-
pared with diversification. It improves EPR when H is the optimal supplier (Model 1)
and achieves similar EPR when L is the optimal supplier (Model 3). In comparison, L
sole-sourcing is not as robust, since it reduces EPR under SD when the optimal supplier
is H.
Notice that in addition to predicting robust performance improvements over diversi-
fication, H sole-sourcing has special implications for RV, since it helps achieve win-win
outcomes that benefit the buying firm as well as society. When examining the con-
sistency of SoleSourcers’ strategies, we find that participants indeed avoid exclusively
doing business with L, as no one consistently sole-sourced from L. But the benefit of
committing entirely to H appears to not be fully recognized by the majority of the Sole-
Sourcers, as the proportions of SoleSourcers who always source from H are both below
50% under SD and RV, although this proportion is higher under RV when compared
with SD (38.86% vs. 16.81%).
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Table 4.7: Influence of Different Sole-sourcing Strategies on EPR
 OptSupplier = H OptSupplier = L 
 SD RV SD RV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0.928*** 0.533*** 0.830*** 0.790*** 
 (0.013) (0.041) (0.014) (0.013) 
Round 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002+ 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Impact 0.5   0.033*** 0.011 
   (0.006) (0.012) 
Impact 0.7  -0.060*** 0.079*** 0.049*** 
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) 
Impact 1 -0.036*** -0.110*** 0.122***  
 (0.010) (0.022) (0.012)  
Likelihood 0.5  -0.109*** 0.005 -0.015 
  (0.023) (0.009) (0.011) 
Likelihood 0.75 -0.036** -0.169*** -0.058*** -0.0001 
 (0.014) (0.031) (0.009) (0.013) 
H-Sole 0.106*** 0.647*** 0.010 0.088*** 
 (0.010) (0.030) (0.013) (0.009) 
L-Sole -0.242*** 0.262*** 0.115*** 0.193*** 
 (0.071) (0.058) (0.010) (0.009) 
Observations 300 735 900 525 
R2 0.411 0.761 0.302 0.477 
Adjusted R2 0.401 0.759 0.295 0.470 
Note: +: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 
 
4.5.3 What Individual Attributes Are Associated with Diversification
and Favoring the High-cost Supplier?
As our analysis highlights the finding that diversification is detrimental while H sole-
sourcing is beneficial, it is crucial to understand whether certain individual attributes
contribute to buyers’ adoption of these strategies. By uncovering the link between
individual differences and strategy adoption, we open new opportunities to nudge buyers
toward improved decision quality. Guided by our behavioral theories in section 3.3, we
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focus on cognitive and affective aspects to identify potential influencing factors.
Our behavioral theories suggest that cognitive processing and affective reactions
influence buyers’ decisions in different ways. On the cognitive side, a complex risk
structure requires buyers to adopt a different mindset. When the impact of a risky
event crosses over to the high-cost supplier, buyers must understand the “all-or-nothing”
nature of risk exposure in order to make informed decisions. Buyers who understand
this unique risk structure are more likely to prioritize sole-sourcing strategies. However,
prior literature points out that it is common for people to adopt linear heuristics when
making decisions. Buyers who are under the influence of this bias may perceive the
overall supply chain risk exposure to be linear in terms of the order quantity from
the low-cost supplier and will find it more challenging to handle this risk structure.
Therefore, buyers’ tendency to engage in linear thinking might negatively correlate
with their likelihood of adopting sole-sourcing strategies when the risk scope extends
beyond the focal supplier. On the other hand, although this understanding helps reduce
diversification, it does not necessarily improve the chances of committing to H, because
buyers can lower costs while accepting a certain level of risk by sole-sourcing from L. To
capture this difference in participants’ tendency to engage in linear thinking in terms
of risk exposure, we adopt a scenario question specific to each risk type as part of the
survey questions (see Appendix). The variable LinearThinking takes the value of 1 if
a participant perceives the overall risk exposure to increase when order quantities from
the low-cost supplier increase, and 0 otherwise.
On the affective side, an emotion-laden context can shift buyers’ preferences between
the two suppliers. When the risk involves a business practice violation, strong reactions
should push buyers away from doing business with the low-cost supplier, which engages
in potentially questionable practices, and toward the high-cost supplier. In other words,
strong affective reactions not only reduce diversification but also increase the likelihood
of committing to sole-sourcing from H. To capture differences in buyers’ affective reac-
tions, we measure their perception of the low-cost supplier’s control and responsibility
for the risky event, which is assessed using a seven-point Likert scale. Following Tang
et al. (2020), we asked participants in the survey to rate the extent to which they think
the low-cost supplier had “control” and “influence” over the outcome and was “respon-
sible,” “accountable,” and “blameworthy” for the risky event on a 1 (not at all) to 7
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(extremely) scale. The five items show high reliability (α = 0.88) and thus their mean
is used for the ControlResponsibility measure.
We added three control variables in our analysis. The first two are participants’
gender and age. To control for the general cognitive capability that has been shown to
influence decision-making (e.g., Moritz et al. 2013), we include the third control vari-
able to capture participants’ cognitive reflection level using the established cognitive
reflection test (Frederick 2005). Following prior studies in behavioral operations man-
agement (e.g., Csermely and Minner 2015, Narayanan and Moritz 2015), we classify
participants with at least two correct answers in cognitive reflection test as the High
CR group (CRHigh = 1) and the rest as the Low CR group (CRHigh = 0).
We include the above-referenced individual attributes as independent variables in a
series of logit regressions, with the dependent variable being the strategy used in each
round. Table 4.8 summarizes the relationship between individual attributes and the
tendency to diversify. As we see, LinearThinking increases the likelihood of diversifi-
cation under RV but has no effect under SD. On the other hand, ControlResponsibility
reduces buyers’ likelihood of using a diversification strategy under RV but has no ef-
fect under SD. These results are consistent with our theory. LinearThinking increases
diversification only when the scope is broad and affective reactions can reduce diversi-
fication when the context involves violations.
Employing a similar format, Table 4.9 summarizes the relationship between in-
dividual attributes and the tendency to sole-source from H. In these two models,
LinearThinking has no significant influence under either SD or RV. However, we see
that ControlResponsibility significantly increases the likelihood of sole-sourcing from
H. Again, these results support our theory that highlights the role of affective reactions
in pushing buyers toward exclusively sourcing from the high-cost supplier, which does
not involve any moral ambiguity. Taken together, these results confirm our behavioral
theory regarding how cognitive and affective aspects influence buyers’ sourcing deci-
sions in different ways. While cognitive processing can narrow the choice set, it does
not tilt buyers toward either the high- or low-cost supplier. In contrast, affective reac-
tions nudge buyers toward the high-cost supplier, which in turn reduces diversification
tendencies.
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Table 4.8: The Relationship between Individual Attributes and Diversification
 SD RV 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 2.454*** 2.418* 
 (0.735) (0.983) 
Round 0.011 -0.044* 
 (0.011) (0.018) 
Impact 0.5 0.234+ -0.503** 
 (0.142) (0.163) 
Impact 0.7 -0.154 -0.929*** 
 (0.153) (0.173) 
Impact 1 -0.564*** -1.379*** 
 (0.141) (0.226) 
Likelihood 0.5 -0.193+ -0.636*** 
 (0.107) (0.138) 
Likelihood 0.75 -0.578*** -1.053*** 
 (0.128) (0.192) 
Age -0.014 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Male -0.139 -0.072 
 (0.323) (0.341) 
CRHigh -0.596+ -0.541 
 (0.325) (0.377) 
LinearThinking -0.256 0.904* 
 (0.379) (0.359) 
ControlResponsibility -0.062 -0.416*** 
 (0.121) (0.097) 
Observations 1,200 1,260 
Log Likelihood -735.614 -598.152 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,495.229 1,220.304 
Note: +: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 
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Table 4.9: The Relationship between Individual Attributes and Sole-sourcing from H
 SD RV 
 (1) (2) 
Constant -4.823*** -4.231*** 
 (0.847) (1.039) 
Round -0.015 0.021 
 (0.016) (0.018) 
Impact 0.5 0.909*** 1.343*** 
 (0.266) (0.192) 
Impact 0.7 1.567*** 1.936*** 
 (0.273) (0.209) 
Impact 1 2.146*** 2.312*** 
 (0.277) (0.240) 
Likelihood 0.5 0.865*** 0.895*** 
 (0.184) (0.148) 
Likelihood 0.75 1.400*** 1.450*** 
 (0.197) (0.196) 
Age 0.018 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Male -0.377 -0.205 
 (0.326) (0.311) 
CRHigh 0.390 0.366 
 (0.372) (0.344) 
LinearThinking 0.082 -0.418 
 (0.383) (0.308) 
ControlResponsibility 0.168 0.359*** 
 (0.123) (0.107) 
Observations 1,200 1,260 
Log Likelihood -560.500 -656.629 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,145.000 1,337.257 
Note: +: p < 0.1; *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001 
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusions
This study continues our comparison between buyers’ sourcing decisions under SD and
RV in terms of the extent of diversification and the probability of selecting the optimal
supplier. We first establish the robustness of these behavioral regularities with a different
participant pool possessing management experience.
Our research then goes one step further to identify the exact source of the variation
in buyers’ sourcing behavior under SD and RV. Based on the risk taxonomy we pro-
pose, we introduce three additional treatments and systematically vary their structure
and context characteristics. This design offers the opportunity to isolate the effects of
structure and context characteristics, allowing us to compare the relative influence of
these characteristics on our dependent variables of interest (i.e., diversification and cor-
rect sole-sourcing). Our analysis reveals that structure characteristics, particularly the
scope of influence, are the dominant influencing factors, while context characteristics
play a less important role. Specifically, participants tend to diversify less and are more
likely to correctly sole-source when the high-cost supplier is optimal under a risk type
that influences both suppliers in the supply base (i.e., scope = cross). In contrast, it
appears that context only matters when the structure is demand-cross. Under such
circumstances, participants facing a violation context tend to diversify less than those
facing a disruption context. One interesting observation is that buyers seem to be averse
to fully committing to the low-cost supplier when that supplier is the profit-maximizing
option. Even when the context is neutralized, we still do not observe more correct
sole-sourcing when the low-cost supplier is optimal. This question is left for future
research.
We take advantage of the opportunities offered by our data to evaluate how buyers’
behavioral decisions, as described above, translate into their profit performance. Our
analysis reveals that buyers perform worse when they diversify (vs. sole-source). When
they do recognize the need to sole-source, our analysis further demonstrates that it is
better for buyers to err toward sole-sourcing from the high-cost supplier. Under SD, sole-
sourcing from H improves performance compared with diversification when the optimal
supplier is H, as we can expect, while its effectiveness is on par with a diversification
strategy when the optimal supplier is L. Under RV, sole-sourcing from H is even
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better. It improves performance over diversification when the optimal supplier is H or
L. There are two potential reasons behind this result. First, from the supplier selection
perspective, committing to H helps overcome the more serious issue of diversification
and prevent the loss due to diversification bias, as we witness in section 4.5.1. Second,
from the order quantity decision perspective, committing to H helps avoid errors in
order quantity adjustment: on the normative side, as shown in our analytical models,
sourcing from L is associated with another decision problem of determining how much to
order, whereas sourcing from H always implies ordering up to demand; on the behavioral
side, order quantity adjustment proves to be a difficult task—our experimental results
in Study 1 show that participants often neglect the need to make adjustments in order
quantities, and even when they do adjust, they do not necessarily choose the correct
direction. As a result, H sole-sourcing can serve as a fool-proof strategy to fend off
other decision errors.
Because avoiding diversification and favoring the high-cost supplier are important
in improving buyers’ performance, it is helpful to understand who are naturally more
inclined to pursue these strategies. These insights into the association between in-
dividual characteristics and strategy adoption provide potential avenues for nudging
buyers. Consistent with our behavioral theories, our results demonstrate that cognitive
processing and affective reactions influence buyers’ ordering decisions through different
channels. Cognitive factors, as exemplified by a linear thinking style, may influence
buyers’ propensity to identify sole-sourcing as a candidate solution but may not nec-
essarily push them to exclusively sole-source from H. However, affective factors, such
as perceived control and responsibility, influence buyers’ tendency to sole-source pri-
marily through encouraging more H sole-sourcing. Therefore, our results suggest that
there are two potential ways to help buyers achieve better performance. First, help-
ing buyers to understand the all-or-nothing nature of risk structure is critical when
the scope is broad. This improves their tendency to consider a sole-sourcing strategy.
Second, highlighting the potential social consequences of sourcing from suppliers with
potential business practice problems or utilizing subconscious priming techniques aimed
at improving ethical decision-making (e.g., Welsh and Ordóñez 2014) may induce the
activation of affective reactions, which in turn encourages more sole-sourcing from the
risk-free supplier.
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Our study can be extended and expanded in the following directions. First, firms face
increased scrutiny from governments for their supply chain conduct (e.g., Knolle and
Evans 2021) and even legal challenges associated with their suppliers’ business practices
(e.g., Hurley 2021). It may be helpful to further explore other risk types arising from
these additional stakeholder actions in future research. Second, these additional risk
types may require a more complex risk taxonomy to disentangle their differences. Our
risk taxonomy serves as a starting point for those future endeavors. Finally, our analysis
examines the influence of selective cognitive and affective factors on buyers’ sourcing
strategies. Future studies may expand the selection of individual attributes and consider
alternative measures to capture these factors. In addition, it may be valuable to explore
potential interventions for behavioral changes by combining individual differences and
situational characteristics (Figner and Weber 2011, p. 215).
Chapter 5
Study 3: Capacity Investment in
Global Vaccine Supply Chains
under Regulatory Risks
5.1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates how global crises can create considerable pressure
on healthcare supply chains. By June 2021, the pandemic had claimed more than 3.9
million lives and more than 182 million people had tested positive worldwide.1 At earlier
stages of the pandemic, countries focused significant effort on producing or procuring
personal protection equipment (PPE) and other necessary medical supplies to contain
infections and treat infected patients. To deal with supply shortages amid rapidly rising
demand, governments resorted to a variety of political and administrative approaches to
acquire critical medical supplies, often at the expense of other countries. It is reported
that by June 2021, more than 100 trade-related policies restricting export control related
to medical supplies are still active.2
As vaccines emerge as a key tool to combat the pandemic, some governments have
1Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering. COVID-19 Data Repository.
https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19. See also Dong et al. (2020).





used export restrictions specifically targeting this critical commodity as a reaction to
public and political pressure to ensure sufficient domestic vaccine supply. This situation
confirms prior concerns, raised as early as mid-2020, that governments’ previous pro-
tection actions toward medical supplies like PPE would expand to vaccines once they
became available (Loftus and Hinshaw 2020). A number of governments, including the
European Union, the United States, and India, have enacted vaccine export controls in
various forms (Vela and Heath 2021, Williams and Stacey 2021, Menon 2021), despite
warnings from a variety of relevant communities on the dangers of “vaccine nationalism”
(e.g., Weintraub et al. 2020, Kupferschmidt 2020).
Such government interventions to limit exports have important implications for
firms’ production capacity investment decisions, since they introduce regulatory risks
to supply chains (Pournader et al. 2020) and present unique challenges to vaccine man-
ufacturers with respect to managing their international production and distribution
networks. More specifically, manufacturers may be confronted with the dilemma of
either adding more capacity at an existing location in the home country where the
manufacturer is based (referred to as the ‘domestic’ country in our analysis) or expand-
ing production in a different country (referred to as ‘overseas’ country) to mitigate the
effects of export restrictions from the domestic government. In the case of the COVID-
19 vaccine, some manufacturers reportedly considered these capacity implications even
before their candidate vaccines were approved due to strong concerns over potential
vaccine nationalism issues (Loftus and Hinshaw 2020). When approaching the general
question of whether to diversity production across multiple locations, manufacturers
try to weigh the efficient benefits of pooling capacity with the potential localized cost
benefits that diversification can offer (Schmitt et al. 2015, Kulkarni et al. 2004). The
equation changes with the prospect of regulatory mandates that may restrict product
movement between countries. However, there is little research available to guide vac-
cine manufacturers’ decisions on whether to diversify and how much capacity to commit
when facing challenges associated with this unique regulatory risk. On the other hand,
without a good understanding of manufacturers’ potential reactions to these regulatory
mandates, governments cannot accurately assess how such mandates will play out and
eventually impact vaccine availability and public health outcome. Therefore, a detailed
analysis of the potential policy implications of such regulatory mandates is needed to
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inform policy decisions.
This study aims to address these gaps by examining the following research questions:
(1) When faced with a regulatory mandate, how does a vaccine manufacturer change
its capacity commitment strategy (i.e., pool all production in the domestic market vs.
produce in both markets) and corresponding capacity levels? (2) How do these decisions
change based on the type of regulatory mandate imposed? (3) What implications do
these decisions have on key performance measures related to vaccine availability and
public health outcome?
We address these questions by constructing a set of analytical models that capture
the capacity investment decisions of a vaccine manufacturer considering two production
locations in light of uncertain demand and potential regulatory mandates that restrict
the export of vaccines. Profit margins may differ across the two countries based on
differences in unit retail price, unit production cost, and transportation cost from the
domestic to the overseas market. We start by examining how the manufacturer sets
capacity levels for each country without regulatory intervention. Next, we investigate
how the manufacturer’s optimal decisions change when regulatory mandates are imposed
by the domestic government to regulate vaccine export from the domestic country to the
overseas country. We focus on two types of regulatory mandates: a random ban, where
there is a probability that the government could ban export to the overseas country
outright, and priority requirement, where the firm must ensure it meets all domestic
demand before being allowed to export.
Our analytical models help characterize the manufacturer’s optimal capacity com-
mitment strategy regarding manufacturing locations (i.e., pool all production in the
domestic market vs. diversify production to both markets). Our numerical study re-
veals additional insights regarding how the manufacturer’s capacity investment levels
in the two markets vary under the two regulatory settings. Subsequently, we investi-
gate how the changes in capacity investment levels influence service level and public
health outcome. Examining the implications of such mandates on the domestic mar-
ket, overseas market, and global system provides a comprehensive understanding of the
potential macro-level consequences of these mandates, including possible disparities of
vaccine availability and public health outcomes across locations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, we introduce our
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analytical framework that captures the decision settings of the manufacturer and briefly
discuss some structural results of our analytical models. Next, in section 5.3, we present
a numerical study that investigates the implications of the two regulatory mandates on
the manufacturer’s capacity investment strategies and corresponding impacts on service
level and public health outcome. We conclude with a discussion in section 5.4.
5.2 Analytical Models and Analysis
We consider a profit-maximizing vaccine manufacturer that serves random demand over
a fixed period in two markets: a domestic market where the manufacturer’s existing
capacity is located (Country 1) and an overseas market where the manufacturer can
build capacity (Country 2).3 Country i’s demand Di is a random variable with support
[0, di], where di is the population of Country i. We denote D = (D1, D2)
′ and its joint
probability density function as f(D1, D2). The manufacturer’s problem is to determine
the optimal level of production capacity, Ki, to invest in Country i (i = 1, 2). For
simplicity, we assume that the unit capacity investment cost is the same across the
two markets and is denoted as c. In Country i, the unit manufacturing cost and retail
price are denoted as mi and pi, respectively. We assume that vaccines produced in
Country 1 can be transported to Country 2 at a unit transshipment cost of t, but
shipment from Country 2 to Country 1 is not feasible. We focus on the one-directional
transshipment scenario to highlight the implications of unilateral regulatory mandates
and maintain the tractability of our models. In this production and transportation
network, the manufacturer has three fulfillment options. Domestic demand can only
be satisfied by vaccines produced in the domestic country, but overseas demand can
be satisfied by vaccines produced in the overseas country and transshipped from the
domestic country. When production and consumption both occur within the domestic
country or the overseas country, the fulfillment option is denoted as D or O, respectively.
Fulfillment option T denotes the opportunity to supply the overseas country through
cross-border transportation of vaccines. Figure 5.1 illustrates these fulfillment options.











Figure 5.1: Illustration of Vaccine Fulfillment Options
5.2.1 Base Case
We first consider the base case where no government mandates are imposed to limit vac-
cine export from the domestic country. The sequence of events in this case is as follows.
In the first stage, before the random demands Di are realized, the manufacturer decides
the capacity investment levels K = (K1,K2)
′. In the second stage, after observing the
realization of Di, the manufacturer determines fulfillment quantities associated with the
three fulfillment options x = (xD, xO, xT )
′, subject to the capacity constraints set by
K. To simplify notation, we define vj as the net value (profitability) per unit of vaccine
fulfilled through option j. Specifically, we have:
vj ≡

p1 −m1, for j = D
p2 −m2, for j = O
p2 −m1 − t, for j = T
.
We assume vj > c.
The above-described setting can be modeled as a stochastic programming problem
with recourse. It can be solved through backward induction, starting with the second-
stage problem. The second-stage problem takes the first-stage capacity decisions K as
input and determines the optimal production and transportation plan. This problem is





subject to xD + xT 6 K1, xO 6 K2,
xD 6 D1, xO + xT 6 D2.
The optimal solution follows a greedy policy, fulfilling demand across the three
options based on the ordering of vj (j = D,O, T ). To illustrate the manufacturer’s
optimal decisions in the second stage, it is useful to classify all possible combinations of
vj ’s into six scenarios based on which demand fulfillment option is the most profitable.
When the overseas fulfillment option dominates, there are two possibilities: either the
transshipment fulfillment option is the second-most profitable (vD < vT < vO), or the
domestic fulfillment option is the second-most profitable (vT < vD < vO). We denote
the former scenario as OT and the latter as OD, with each pair of letters indicating the
two fulfillment options with the highest net value in descending order. Similarly, we use
DT to denote vO < vT < vD and DO to denote vT < vO < vD. When the transshipment
fulfillment option dominates, we use a different notation for the second letter to indicate
how large vD is: TM denotes the scenario where vD is moderately high (vT < vD + vO),
while TE denotes the scenario where vD is extremely high (vT > vD +vO). The optimal
production and transportation plans under each scenario, based on inputs K and D,
are shown in Figure 5.2.
Several patterns emerge from the results shown in Figure 5.2. When the overseas
fulfillment option dominates, the second-stage solutions of OT and OD scenarios only
differ when the demand is relatively high (regions Ω2 and Ω3). In contrast, when
the domestic fulfillment option dominates, the second-stage solutions of DT and DO
scenarios only differ when the demand is relatively low (regions Ω0 and Ω1). When the
transshipment fulfillment option dominates, TM and TE scenarios only differ in regions
where the demand in the overseas market is in the low to intermediate range and the
demand in the domestic market is not too low.
Turning to the first-stage problem, here the decision variable is the capacity invest-
ment level Ki for each location i. The manufacturer chooses these levels to optimize
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π(K,D)f(D1, D2) dD1 dD2 − c(K1 +K2)
subject to Ki > 0, i = 1, 2.
To solve this first-stage problem, we first focus on the structural property of its
expected profit function, which is captured by the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. The manufacturer’s expected profit function under the base case is jointly
concave in K.
Building on this property, our analytical analysis focuses on identifying when the
manufacturer should invest capacity only at the domestic location vs. both locations.
We refer to the first strategy as ‘pool’ and the second as ‘diversify’. To facilitate the
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presentation, we introduce the notation K̃DO = (K̃DO1 , 0), which represents the bound-
ary solution in scenario DO. The manufacturer’s optimal capacity commitment strategy
is then characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. The manufacturer’s optimal capacity commitment strategy under the
base case scenario is as follows:
(1) Diversify when
(a) vO > max{vD, vT }, or
(b) vT < vO < vD and c < vO − vTP1, where P1 = Pr(D1 +D2 6 K̃DO1 );
(2) Pool when
(a) vO < vT , or
(b) vT < vO < vD and c > vO − vTP1.
Proposition 5.1 highlights that the relative profitability of the three fulfillment op-
tions determines whether the manufacturer should diversify. When the overseas fulfill-
ment option dominates (i.e., vO > max{vD, vT }, in scenarios OT and OD), it is always
optimal to diversify. In contrast, when the overseas fulfillment option is less profitable
than the transshipment fulfillment option (i.e., vO > max{vD, vT }, in scenarios DT,
TM, and TE), it is always optimal to pool capacity in the domestic country. When the
overseas fulfillment option is moderately profitable and the domestic fulfillment option
dominates (i.e., vT < vO < vD), the manufacturer’s optimal diversification strategy
depends on the unit capacity investment cost. When this cost is relatively low, it is
better to diversify; when this cost is relatively high, it is better to consolidate all the
capacity in the domestic country and take advantage of the risk-pooling effect.
5.2.2 Random Ban
We now consider how the manufacturer’s decision problem changes when facing the
domestic government’s mandates to regulate vaccine export in the hope of improving
domestic vaccine availability. We begin with the case of a random ban (RB). Under this
scenario, the domestic government may issue an export ban that prohibits the manu-
facturer from exporting any vaccine to the overseas country, but there is uncertainty
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regarding whether the government will activate this ban. We capture this uncertainty
by a random event with a known probability. This broad and preemptive measure
might be utilized when the domestic government cannot accurately track and measure
domestic demand. As a result, the government may want to err on the side of caution.
The sequence of events in this setting differs from that in the base case in the
following ways. First, before the manufacturer makes capacity investment decisions, it is
aware that the government may impose an export ban with a probability δ. Second, after
the manufacturer makes the capacity investments, the domestic government’s export
ban status is realized and the manufacturer observes the demand in the two countries.
The introduction of this mandate changes the manufacturer’s second-stage problem by
adding another constraint xT = 0 with a probability δ. The manufacturer’s optimal
fulfillment plan if the export ban is activated is shown in Figure 5.3. We denote profit
in this circumstance as ΠB(K1,K2). It is straightforward to see that the manufacturer’s
expected profit under the random ban is the weighted average of its expected profit under
the base case and expected profit when the export ban is activated, i.e., ΠRB(K1,K2) =





𝑥 = (𝐷1, 𝐷2, 0)
Ω1
𝑥 = (𝐷1, 𝐾2, 0)
Ω2
𝑥 = (𝐾1, 𝐾2, 0)
Ω4
𝑥 = (𝐾1, 𝐷2, 0)
𝐷2
Figure 5.3: Fulfilled Vaccine Quantities by Fulfillment Options when the Export Ban is
Activated
To solve the manufacturer’s problem, we again start by examining the structural
properties of the manufacturer’s expected profit function. The results are presented
below.
Lemma 5.2. The manufacturer’s expected profit function under the random ban is
jointly concave in K.
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To characterize the manufacturer’s optimal first-stage capacity decisions, we again
introduce additional notation. Let K̂s = (K̂s1 , 0) be the boundary solution in scenario
s ∈ {DO,DT, TM, TE} under the random ban. The following result characterizes the
manufacturer’s optimal capacity commitment strategy in this case.
Proposition 5.2. The manufacturer’s optimal capacity commitment strategy under the
random ban scenario is as follows:
(1) Diversify when
(a) vO > max{vD, vT }, or
(b) vT < vO < vD and c < vO−(1−δ)vTPDO1 , where PDO1 = Pr(D1 +D2 6 K̂DO1 ),
or




, where PDT1 = Pr(D1 + D2 6
K̂DT1 ), or
(d) max{vD, vO} < vT < vD + vO and c < vO
(
1− (1− δ)P TM1
)
− (1 − δ)(vT −
vD)P
TM
2 , where P
TM
1 = Pr(D1 +D2 6 K̂
TM
1 ) and P
TM
2 = Pr(D2 6 K̂
TM
1 )−
P TM1 , or
(e) vT > vD + vO and c < vO
(
δ − (1− δ)P TE3
)




(a) vT < vO < vD and c > vO − (1− δ)vTPDO1 , or





(c) max{vD, vO} < vT < vD + vO and c > vO
(
1− (1− δ)P TM1
)




(d) vT > vD + vO and c > vO
(
δ − (1− δ)P TE3
)
.
Comparing Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, we see that the introduction of a random ban
leads to important differences in the manufacturer’s optimal capacity commitment strat-
egy. When the profitability of the transshipment fulfillment option is higher than that of
the overseas fulfillment option (i.e., vO < vT ), it may no longer be optimal to pool all ca-
pacity in the domestic country, because the transshipment fulfillment option will be cut
off if the export ban is activated. When the unit capacity investment is relatively low,
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it becomes advantageous for the manufacturer to diversify under such circumstances
to counteract the potential export ban. In contrast, when the overseas fulfillment op-
tion dominates (i.e., vO > max{vD, vT }), the manufacturer’s optimal strategy does not
change, and diversifying is still the preferred option. We formally summarize these
insights in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. The introduction of the random ban causes the manufacturer to switch
its capacity commitment strategy from pooling to diversifying when:





(b) In the DO scenario and vO − vTP1 < c < vO − (1− δ)vTPDO1 , or
(c) In the TM scenario and c < vO
(
1− (1− δ)P TM1
)
− (1− δ)(vT − vD)P TM2 , or
(d) In the TE scenario and c < vO
(




We next consider the case of a priority requirement (PR) mandate. In this case, the
domestic government introduces a mandate that requires the manufacturer to prioritize
domestic demand. Under this mandate, vaccine export to the overseas country is only
allowed after all domestic demand has been satisfied. Unlike a random ban, this mandate
is more surgical and does not involve any uncertainty associated with the activation of
this policy.
A priority requirement is usually issued before capacity decisions are made. There-
fore, the effect of this mandate manifests in the second stage of the manufacturer’s
decision problem by further restricting the value of xD to be one of two cases such
that xD = min{D1,K1}. This restriction does not change the nature of the solu-
tion but reduces the number of scenarios to consider under PR. When the domestic
fulfillment option is more profitable than the transshipment fulfillment option (i.e.,
vD > vT ), there is no change in the manufacturer’s expected profit function, since
the domestic market is always supplied first. Thus, ΠODPR (K1,K2) = Π
OD
BC (K1,K2),
ΠDOPR (K1,K2) = Π
DO




BC(K1,K2). As a result, the
introduction of PR does not change the manufacturer’s optional capacity investment
decisions in those scenarios. However, when the transshipment fulfillment option is
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more lucrative (i.e., vD < vT ), the manufacturer’s priority shifts from exporting to
satisfying domestic demand, in order to comply with the PR mandate. This change
makes the manufacturer’s expected profit function under PR differ from that under
BC: ΠOTPR(K1,K2) = Π
OD
BC (K1,K2) and Π
TM





Therefore, the manufacturer might need to adjust its capacity investment strategies in
response to the mandate imposed by the domestic government.
To characterize the manufacturer’s optimal capacity commitment strategy, we again
start by examining whether the expected profit function is jointly concave in K. Unfor-
tunately, this is not the case for the priority requirement (a counterexample is provided
in the Appendix), so it becomes challenging to obtain a closed-form solution. We resort
to numerical analyses to help us identify the manufacturer’s optimal solutions.
5.3 Numerical Study
In this section, we present a numerical study to understand how the two types of reg-
ulatory mandates influence the manufacturer’s optimal capacity investment strategies.
These analyses not only help compare the manufacturer’s optimal responses to these
mandates, but also allow us to evaluate how changes in the manufacturer’s operations
impact the vaccine service level and associated public health outcome.
5.3.1 Parameter Space Setup
The key parameters of the manufacturer’s decision problem include the net value of
each vaccine fulfillment option vj , the unit capacity investment cost c, the likelihood
that an export ban will be enacted δ, and the populations of the two countries di. Our
parameters are grounded in the numerical examples of Lu and Van Mieghem (2009) but
extend to a wider range of values.
We consider a wide range of profitability levels for the fulfillment options, with
vD, vO, vT ∈ {5, 7, 9, · · · , 25}. As our analytical results suggest that the manufacturer’s
capacity commitment strategy is sensitive to the underlying unit capacity investment
cost, we consider a more granular set of c ∈ {1, 1.2, 1.4, · · · , 25}. For the random
ban case, we incorporate five different levels of likelihood that an export ban will be
activated: δ ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. As the insights are quite consistent across different
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δ values, we only report the results of the δ = 0.5 case.
We assume throughout this numerical study that vaccine demand in the two coun-
tries is independent and uniformly distributed with Di ∼ [0, di]. To evaluate how the
differences in the two countries’ populations may influence the results, we consider three
sets of settings: (i) the countries have equal populations – d1 = d2 = 100; (ii) the do-
mestic country has the larger population – d1 = 100 and d2 ∈ {50, 60, 70, 80, 90}; and
(iii) the domestic country has the smaller population – d1 ∈ {50, 60, 70, 80, 90} and
d2 = 100. In this section, we first focus on the results of setting (i) with equal popu-
lations and then summarize how the main insights differ when the two countries have
different populations.
5.3.2 Influence on Capacity Commitment Strategy and Capacity Lev-
els
We begin by investigating how a regulatory mandate will influence the manufacturer’s
optimal capacity commitment strategy and capacity levels. For the random ban condi-
tion, we are primarily interested in evaluating the relative proportion of cases in which
the manufacturer needs to switch from pooling to diversifying. For the priority require-
ment condition, we are interested in gaining insights into the structure of the optimal
solution, including how the mandate shifts its capacity commitment strategies relative
to the base case.
Table 5.1 summarizes the impact of the two regulatory mandates on the manu-
facturer’s capacity commitment strategies in different scenarios. For the random ban
condition, the results confirm our Corollary 5.1 that there are only three possibilities:
the manufacturer either stays with its diversifying or pooling strategy or switching from
pooling to diversifying. What is important in the table is that the manufacturer needs
to change its strategy in many cases. On the other hand, for the priority requirement
condition, we see that the manufacturer rarely needs to switch from pooling to diversi-
fying (only 1.1% of TM). In scenarios other than TM, it stays with either diversifying or
pooling. Across the influence of the two regulatory mandates, it appears that a priority
requirement requires fewer strategic changes since the manufacturer usually does not
need to worry about building capacities in the overseas country and can focus primarily
on adjusting capacity investment levels instead. To understand how the manufacturer
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should tweak its capacity levels, we continue our analysis and examine in each setting,
whether the manufacture should increase or decrease its capacity investment levels in
the two countries.
Table 5.1: Impact of Regulatory Mandates on Capacity Commitment Strategy































Table 5.2 shows how the manufacturer’s optimal capacity investment level changes
in the domestic country, the overseas country, and the global level (Kg = K1 + K2).
The results are organized by different scenarios and capacity commitment strategies
corresponding to Table 5.1. Each column displays the proportion of cases in which
the capacity level at the location increases, and the corresponding proportion of cases
that witness a decrease is listed in parentheses as a reference.4 The column “Case
Percentage” indicates the relative weight of each subset in the entire parameter space to
help us understand the relative frequency of encountering such settings. We see that the
pattern is relatively straightforward for RB. The manufacturer’s capacity investment in
the domestic country always decreases since the optional value of excess capacity in the
domestic country is hampered by the prospect of a ban. In addition, the manufacturer
chooses to invest more in the overseas country as long as it is profitable to diversify.
Otherwise, the manufacturer simply reduces its domestic capacity without adding new
capacity in the overseas country. Although the two forces point to different directions,
the net global capacity investment level increases in more cases when diversifying is the
optimal strategy.
The pattern for the priority requirement is different. When it is optimal to stick to
pooling, the manufacturer’s optimal domestic capacity investment level almost always
4Since the manufacturer’s decisions do not change in OD, DO, and DT scenarios, the results of these
scenarios are noted as “–” in the table and subsequent tables of outcome measures.
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increases, resulting in a global capacity increase. When it is optimal to stay with diver-
sifying, the optimal capacity level in the overseas country increases, but the domestic
capacity level may increase or decrease. It appears that the forces increasing capacity
investment dominate such that the global capacity investment usually increases in such
scenarios. In the rare cases in which the manufacturer needs to switch from pooling to
diversifying, part of the domestic capacity is shifted to the overseas market.
Comparing the two panels in Table 5.2, we see that the two regulatory mandates
influence the manufacturer’s optimal capacity investment levels in different ways. A
random ban induces avoidance of building up higher capacity in the domestic country,
so the manufacturer either shifts some domestic capacity to the overseas country or
reduces domestic capacity without adding overseas capacity. In contrast, under the
priority requirement condition, since excess domestic capacity can still be used to satisfy
overseas demand, this mandate in general encourages the manufacturer to increase
domestic capacity investment. When the overseas and transshipment fulfillment options
are the top two profit avenues (i.e., the OT scenario), it is advantageous to increase
overseas capacity. However, adding more domestic capacity at the same time may be a
good strategy, as it provides an option to take advantage of the situations in which the
domestic demand is low and overseas demand is high without over-committing capacity
in the overseas country.
To summarize our findings so far, we see that regulatory risks can influence the
manufacturer’s operations strategy. The two mandates we examine can both induce
the manufacturer to change its capacity strategy from pooling to diversifying. As a
result, some domestic capacity is shifted to the overseas country. In fact, under a
random ban, even if the manufacturer stays with its original strategy as in the base
case, the domestic capacity level still decreases. Under a priority requirement, the
domestic capacity may also decrease when the manufacturer has to expand its capacity
diversification in OT and TM scenarios. Given the manufacturer’s strategic responses
to the domestic government’s regulatory mandates, domestic capacity level and even
global capacity level may decrease. Hence, these changes may undermine the domestic
government’s ambition to boost domestic vaccine supply. However, it is important to
note that the regulatory mandates introduced by the domestic government help re-route
some of the vaccine doses that would have been shipped to the overseas country if there
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Table 5.2: Impact of Regulatory Mandates on Capacity Investment Levels
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7.56 100 (0) 0 (0) 100 (0)
were no export control. For this reason, these mandates may still improve domestic
vaccine supply by increasing the effective utilization of domestic capacity directed to
serve domestic demand. To fully understand the efficacy of the domestic government’s
regulatory mandates in promoting the welfare of domestic citizens, we need to further
examine how changes in the manufacturer’s capacity investment levels impact service
level and public health outcome.
5.3.3 Implications for Service Level and Public Health Outcome
To assess the policy implications of the two regulatory mandates, we start by looking
at how service level changes as a result of the manufacturer’s strategic responses to the
mandates. Specifically, we focus on fill rate, which captures the proportion of demand
that is satisfied during the season. Given the committed capacity levels (K1,K2), the
expected fill rate EFRi of the domestic country (i = 1), overseas country (i = 2), and























xD + xO + xT
D1 +D2
dD1 dD2 i = g.
Table 5.3 displays the results of our analysis on fill rate. Under a random ban,
although our previous analysis shows that the domestic capacity level always decreases,
the domestic fill rate does not always suffer. While the fill rate indeed decreases in OD
and DO scenarios, it may stay the same in some of the DT cases. Moreover, in other
scenarios, we actually observe a considerable proportion of cases (as high as 81%) where
the domestic fill rate increases. On the other hand, overseas fill rate only increases in
OD, DO, and DT scenarios, where the domestic fill rate does not increase. The net
effect on the global fill rate is rather detrimental, since the proportion of cases with an
increased global fill rate is quite low.
Under a priority requirement, it turns out that the domestic fill rate in general
increases. At the same time, the overseas fill rate never increases, although the global
fill rate is more likely to increase than to decrease. Comparing the impact of the two
regulatory mandates, we see that they may be surprisingly effective in promoting the
domestic fill rate. However, this benefit comes at the expense of decreased fill rate in
the overseas country, potentially increasing the disparity across the two countries.
Once we understand how service level is impacted, it is also important to evalu-
ate the implications for public health outcome. While the analysis on fill rate reveals
the performance from the operations perspective, additional analysis on how vaccine
availability influences public health is needed in our context because the fill rate cannot
capture the unique value of vaccines in a pandemic.
To fully appreciate the nuances involved in this context, we first need to understand
how vaccination influences the population at a macro level. In the epidemiology litera-
ture, the likelihood of being infected, µ(θ), is modeled as a decreasing function in θ, the
proportion of vaccinated people in the population. If the vaccine is 100% effective, once
θ reaches a critical threshold θ̂, the likelihood of being infected drops to a negligible
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Table 5.3: Impact of Regulatory Mandates on Service Level (Fill Rate)
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0 θ > θ̂,
in which R0 is the basic reproduction number for this disease and the corresponding
herd immunity threshold θ̂ = 1 − 1/R0 (Fine et al. 2011). In other words, it is not
necessary for everyone in a population to be vaccinated in order for that population
to be fully protected. Nevertheless, full population protection requires that there is
sufficient demand from citizens who are willing to get the vaccine and sufficient supply
to satisfy such demand.
The non-linear form of the infection rate function has important implications for
public health outcome: one additional vaccine dose beyond the herd immunity threshold
is not valuable to the protected population, but it could generate a much larger impact
if it could be diverted to another country that has not yet achieved herd immunity.
A suitable measure for public health outcome can allow us to better capture these
dynamics.
In public health literature, the quality-adjusted life year (QALY) has been used
routinely as a common measure to compare healthcare outcomes (Whitehead and Ali
2010). This measure takes into account both mortality and morbidity to provide an
aggregate measure of how patients’ life quality has been impacted by a disease. To
approximate the QALY measure at a population level in our context, we first classify
the population into different groups based on health status. If we denote the infection
fatality rate as σ, then the total population d can be divided into four groups: those who
are vaccinated (x), those who are not vaccinated but not infected ((d−x)(1−µ(x/d))),
those who are infected and do not survive ((d−x)µ(x/d)σ), and those who are infected
but survive ((d − x)µ(x/d)(1 − σ)). Next, we normalize the QALY of healthy people
(either vaccinated or not vaccinated but not infected) as 1, that of surviving patients as
γ, and that of those who die as 0. Note that γ < 1 reflects the reduction in life quality
resulting from long-haul syndrome (e.g., Vanichkachorn et al. 2021, Health 2021). The
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aggregated QALY, as a function of vaccinated people x, can be represented as:
QALY (x) = x · 1 + (d− x)(1− µ(x/d)) · 1 + (d− x)µ(x/d)(1− σ) · γ
= d− (d− x)(1− γ + σγ)µ(x/d)
=

d− (d− x)(1− γ + σγ)R0(1− x/d)− 1
R0(1− x/d)
x/d < 1− 1/R0
d x/d > 1− 1/R0
=

(1− γ(1− σ))x+ 1 + γ(1− σ)(R0 − 1)
R0
d x/d < 1− 1/R0
d x/d > 1− 1/R0.
The expected quality-adjusted life year EQALY in the domestic country, the over-











f(D1, D2)QALY (xO + xT ) dD1 dD2 i = 2
EQALY1(K1,K2) + EQALY2(K1,K2) i = g.
In our numerical study, we set σ = 5% and R0 = 2.5.
5 We choose γ = 0.8 to capture a
moderate reduction in life quality for COVID-19 patients.
Table 5.4 shows how QALYs change when the domestic government introduces a
random ban or a priority requirement. Compared with the fill rate results in Table
5.3, we see that there are significantly more cases in which the QALYs do not change,
potentially due to the non-linear nature of herd immunity. Under a random ban, despite
the general trend of decreased domestic capacity, we observe that domestic QALYs still
increase in more than half of the cases in certain scenarios. However, in these scenarios,
the number of cases with more favorable domestic outcomes generally drops when the
criterion switches from fill rate to QALYs. The opposite occurs at the global level, as we
see that global QALYs may increase more often. This discrepancy is primarily driven
52019 Novel Coronavirus Parameter Estimates, MIDAS 2019 Novel Coronavirus GitHub Repository,
MIDAS Coordination Center (MCC), https://github.com/midas-network/COVID-19/tree/master/
parameter_estimates/2019_novel_coronavirus.
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by the fact that at the global level, QALYs are fully substitutable but fill rates are not.
A unit of QALY increase in the domestic country can thus fully offset a unit of QALY
decrease in the overseas country. However, if the fill rates of the two countries change
in different directions at the same rate, the resulted global fill rate can still decrease. In
contrast, under a priority requirement, the proportions of cases with increased QALYs
in the domestic country and the global system are not as high as the proportions of cases
with increased fill rate. This does not result in a significant drop in QALYs, since we see
many cases fall into the “No Change” category instead of the “Decreasing” category.
Table 5.4: Impact of Regulatory Mandates on Public Health Outcome (QALYs)
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To further investigate the conditions under which a decreased domestic capacity level
translates into better QALYs, we use a figure to illustrate when the domestic QALYs
increase, stay the same, or decrease. We choose to focus on the OT scenario because
there are high proportions of cases with a decreased domestic capacity level under the
two mandates. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate results for the random ban condition and
priority requirement condition, respectively. As we can see from Figure 5.4, when the
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unit capacity investment cost c is relatively low, there is no change in domestic QALYs.
When it increases above a certain threshold, the domestic QALYs are higher under
a random ban compared with the base case. However, as it further increases above
another threshold, the domestic QALYs are lower compared with the base case. The
reason for this pattern is that as c increases, domestic QALYs under the two conditions
first stay the same and then decrease. When c is small, QALYs under the two conditions
are both high, and thus the random ban does not improve QALYs. When c increases
to an intermediate region, QALYs under the base case start to decrease earlier than
QALYs under a random ban. When c is relatively large, QALYs under a random ban
decrease at a higher rate than QALYs under the base case do. Figure 5.5 shows a similar
threshold pattern for the influence of a priority requirement on domestic QALYs, but
since the plot only focuses on cases with decreased domestic capacity, we do not observe
“No change” cases.






























































Figure 5.4: Changes in Domestic QALYs under RB in the OT Scenario
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Figure 5.5: Changes in Domestic QALYs under PR in the OT Scenario (Cases with a
Decreased Domestic Capacity Only)
5.3.4 Implications for the Domestic Country’s Policy Choice
In addition to revealing how the manufacturer responds to the two regulatory mandates
by adjusting its global capacity investment plans and how such adjustments influence
service level and public health outcome, our analysis provides opportunities to inform
the domestic government’s policy choice. By being aware of how the manufacturer will
react to the two types of regulatory mandates, the domestic government can strategically
decide whether implementing a mandate is beneficial.
When the domestic fulfillment option is more profitable than the transshipment
fulfillment option (i.e., vT < vD, OD, DO and DT scenarios), it is clear that a random
ban is not an ideal choice for the domestic government, as it never improves either the
fill rate or QALYs of the domestic country. Under such scenarios, a priority requirement
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will not impact the manufacturer’s decisions, since it is already in the interest of the
manufacturer to prioritize the demand of the domestic country. Hence, the domestic
country does not need to implement any regulatory mandate in these scenarios.
When the transshipment fulfillment option dominates the other two options (i.e.,
vT > max{vD, vO}, TM and TE scenarios), the domestic government needs to be care-
ful, since both a random ban and a priority requirement may force the manufacturer to
switch its capacity commitment strategy from pooling to diversifying, which in general
can lead to worse outcomes for the domestic country. However, under a random ban,
even if the manufacturer keeps a pooling strategy, the fill rate and QALYs of the do-
mestic country may still drop in many cases. On the other hand, a priority requirement
almost always guarantees that the two measures can be on par with the base case.
The trickiest scenario is when the overseas fulfillment option is the most profitable
while the transshipment fulfillment option comes second (i.e., vD < vT < vO, OT
scenario). While neither a random ban nor a priority requirement induces the manu-
facturer’s strategy change (as it is always preferable to diversify), the domestic capacity
level may decrease in many cases under a priority requirement and in all cases under
a random ban. Therefore, it is possible that neither of the two mandates can improve
domestic welfare.
5.3.5 Influence of Country Characteristics on Capacity Commitment
Strategy
Our numerical analysis so far has focused on the setting in which the domestic country
and the overseas country have equal populations, which creates a fair ground to compare
the effects of the two regulatory mandates under different scenarios. However, allowing
the two countries’ populations to vary is also important, since the populations determine
the upper limit of the potential demand, which may shift the focus of the manufacturer’s
global capacity plan. By considering the population difference of the two countries, we
can not only capture a broader range of situations but also provide additional insights
on how the manufacturer’s strategies may change. With these considerations in mind,
we briefly summarize the numerical analysis results of the settings wherein the domestic
country has a larger or smaller population than the overseas country, focusing on the
manufacturer’s capacity commitment strategy.
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When the domestic country has a population advantage (i.e., d1 > d2), the propor-
tion of cases in which the manufacturer needs to switch from pooling to diversifying
under a random ban drops compared with when the two countries have equal popu-
lations. The cost threshold that warrants a shift to the diversifying strategy becomes
smaller, making it more difficult to justify a strategy change unless the capacity invest-
ment cost is meager. In contrast, under a priority requirement, the proportion of cases
in which the manufacturer needs to switch due to the mandate actually increases. This
result may be counterintuitive, as the conventional wisdom might suggest that the do-
mestic country’s population advantage makes pooling more attractive. However, when
there is a large gap between the two countries’ populations, the domestic capacity level
under the base case may already be relatively high. Suppose the manufacturer chooses
to add more capacity in the domestic country. In that case, it is likely that even when
there is excessive domestic capacity, the overseas demand may not be high enough to
consume the spare capacity. These factors result in a lower chance for the manufacturer
to take advantage of pooling capacity in the domestic country. As a result, setting up
capacity in the overseas country can make the manufacturer better off when the overseas
fulfillment option is sufficiently profitable. When the domestic country has a population
disadvantage (i.e., d1 < d2), the pattern is reversed. Under a random ban, the propor-
tion of cases that witness a strategy switch increases as it becomes more important for
the manufacturer to safeguard the revenue stream from the overseas market. Under a
priority requirement, the proportion of cases in which the manufacturer needs to switch
decreases, because the chance of supplying overseas demand with domestic capacity is
higher.
5.4 Discussion and Conclusions
In this study, we investigate how regulatory risks arising from national governments’
mandates that restrict the flow of vaccine export influence manufacturers’ global capac-
ity investment plans. We focus on the capacity planning problem of an international
manufacturer that serves random demand in two countries while facing the regulatory
risk from the domestic government where it is based. We consider two types of regula-
tory mandates: a preemptive export ban that is activated randomly (i.e., random ban)
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and a more targeted measure that prioritizes domestic demand over overseas demand
(i.e., priority requirement). Through our analytical models and numerical study, we
compare how the manufacturer sets its capacity levels in the two countries under differ-
ent regulatory settings and how these decisions translate into service level and public
health outcome, such as vaccine fill rate and QALYs. Our results reveal how the manu-
facturer should strategically counteract the two types of regulatory risks and highlight
important policy implications that can guide the domestic government’s decisions when
implementing the mandates.
When facing the prospect of a random ban, the manufacturer needs to carefully
consider the plan to set up overseas capacity when the transshipment fulfillment option
is more profitable than the overseas fulfillment option. When there is no such regu-
latory mandate, pooling all capacity in the domestic country is the optimal solution.
However, the introduction of the random ban threatens the availability of the trans-
shipment fulfillment option. As a result, it becomes advantageous to diversify and build
some capacity in the overseas country if the capacity investment cost is not overly high.
If this cost is high, then keeping the original strategy to pool in the domestic country is
better. When the profitability of the overseas fulfillment option dominates, diversifying
its capacities in the two countries remains the best option for the manufacturer. Re-
gardless of the scenario, the manufacturer should always decrease its domestic capacity
level, since it is less valuable given the potential export ban. At the same time, part of
the capacity is relocated to the overseas country.
In contrast, when facing the prospect of a priority requirement, the issue of switching
the capacity investment strategy from pooling to diversifying only becomes an active
item for consideration when the domestic country has a larger population than the
overseas country. Under such circumstances, the domestic capacity level is already rela-
tively high when the priority requirement is absent. The likelihood of diverting capacity
from the domestic country to the overseas country decreases due to the population gap.
As a result, it becomes advantageous to set up capacity in the overseas country if the
overseas fulfillment option is sufficiently profitable. On the other hand, when the do-
mestic country has equal or less population than the overseas country, it is better for
the manufacturer to stay with its capacity commitment strategy when there is no pri-
ority requirement and only adjust the capacity levels. In general, this means increasing
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the domestic capacity level, because excessive domestic capacity still can be utilized to
satisfy overseas demand. However, this is not always the case. When it is optimal to
diversify regardless of the priority requirement, the domestic capacity may need to be
lowered, and more overseas capacity may need to be set up.
Because of the manufacturer’s strategic responses to the regulatory mandates, the
resulting domestic capacity investment level may not always go in the direction that
aligns with the domestic government’s intention. This leads to the question of how
effective these regulatory mandates really are. To unpack the implications of the man-
ufacturer’s capacity investment levels on the domestic country and the global system,
we evaluate how important quality outcomes change as a result of the manufacturer’s
capacity level adjustments. Specifically, we focus on vaccine fill rate and QALYs as
the outcome measures for service level and public health, respectively. Our analysis
provides mixed messages.
The good news for the domestic government is that despite the potential decrease
in the domestic capacity level (especially under a random ban), the fill rate and QALYs
of the domestic country do not always decrease. This is the case due to the regulatory
mandates’ capability of re-routing the vaccine dosages to serve the domestic citizens.
The bad news, however, is that the regulatory mandates can still backfire. When the
regulatory mandates result in substantial decreases in the domestic capacity level, the
effect of re-routing is not large enough to compensate for capacity losses, leading to a
worse fill rate and QALYs for the domestic country.
By taking these policy implications into consideration and carefully evaluating the
particular scenario that the manufacturer is facing, the domestic government can be
better positioned to implement a regulatory mandate that can achieve the intended
goal of boosting domestic vaccine supply and public welfare. In fact, not implementing
any regulatory mandate may be the optimal choice for the domestic government. For
example, when the domestic fulfillment option is more profitable than the transshipment
fulfillment option, choosing not to implement a mandate is the best policy. When the
transshipment fulfillment option dominates the other two, a priority requirement is
usually sufficient to reliably improve domestic outcomes. When the overseas fulfillment
option is the most profitable and the domestic fulfillment option is the least profitable,
the situation is more complex. A random ban or a priority requirement might be able
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to improve domestic welfare, but not implementing any mandate may be the best the
domestic government can do.
A challenge that exists in reality, however, is that the domestic government may not
know the relative profitability of the manufacturer’s three fulfillment options. While
it is plausible that the domestic government can accurately gauge how profitable the
domestic fulfillment option is, the information for the other two fulfillment options
may be privately known only to the manufacturer. This potential lack of complete
information hampers the domestic government’s ability to target a specific regulatory
mandate to a specific scenario. From the manufacturer’s perspective, this means that
there are two ways to proactively influence the domestic government’s policy. First, by
sharing the information of all three fulfillment options in certain scenarios, the manufac-
turer can effectively prevent the domestic government’s policy that will hurt its profit.
Second, strategically concealing certain information in other scenarios may allow the
manufacturer to avoid ending up accepting a less favorable policy. From the domestic
government’s perspective, correctly identifying the manufacturer’s incentives and coop-
erating with the manufacturer may prove to be critical for maximizing the welfare of the
domestic citizens. In future research, a game-theoretical framework may be appropriate
to fully capture the dynamics between the manufacturer and the domestic government.
Our research also reveals the tension between the two countries. The domestic
government’s unilateral regulatory mandates almost always lead to worse outcomes for
the overseas country in terms of vaccine fill rate and QALYs, potentially enlarging the
disparities between the two countries. Another fruitful avenue for future research would
be to incorporate the overseas government’s actions and regulations in the analysis
framework. By identifying potential deterrence strategies, actively collaborating with
the manufacturer, or interfering with the cooperation between the manufacturer and the
domestic government described above, the overseas government may be able to influence
the domestic government’s policy or the manufacturer’s strategy in a way that benefits
their own citizens. This research direction offers many possibilities to capture complex
geopolitical risks in the global system.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, we highlight the managerial problems we examine in this dissertation
and summarize the major theoretical contributions and practical implications.
6.1 Influence of Supplier-induced Risks on Sourcing Deci-
sions
In recent years, firms have faced more scrutiny from various stakeholders to oversee
the conduct of suppliers in their extended supply chains. Negligence of potential re-
sponsibility violations or slow response to such incidents, once uncovered by media, can
result in serious business reputation and customer goodwill loss. To understand how
decision-makers react to this emerging responsibility violation risk and how that differs
from traditional supply disruption risk, we use analytical models and incentivized ex-
periments to contrast buyers’ sourcing decisions under the two types of supplier-induced
risks from a normative and a behavioral perspective. We further expand the scope of
our research to account for the potential influence of participant pools and use our risk
taxonomy to help identify why buyers’ sourcing decisions differ across the two risk types.
This dissertation makes the following theoretical contributions:
(1) We offer a parsimonious framework to compare two important supplier-induced
risks in supply chains: supply disruption and responsibility violation risks. This
comparative framework allows us to compare similarities and differences across the
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two risk types so that we can develop a better understanding of what is unique for
each risk type and provide tailored recommendations.
(2) We propose a risk taxonomy to systematically contrast the characteristics of decision
settings of the two risk types based on structural and contextual differences. This
effort not only allows us to evaluate the relative influence of each characteristic but
also offers a template for future research to document the differences of other risk
types.
(3) We consider the influence of cognitive and affective factors on people’s decisions in
our research, which differs from prior behavioral operations literature that focuses
primarily on cognitive influence. This initiative reveals that cognitive processing and
affective reactions influence sourcing decisions through different channels. While
cognitive factors help reduce diversification and increase sole-sourcing, they do not
necessarily make buyers lean toward sole-sourcing from the risk-free supplier. In
contrast, affective factors improve buyers’ tendency to sole-source primarily by in-
creasing their propensity to sole-source from the risk-free supplier.
(4) We provide evidence that buyers’ different ordering behaviors across the two risk
types are robust for participant pools with varying management experience. The
consistency of this behavior shows that decision-makers’ biases and preferences are
unlikely to be eliminated by management experience alone. Therefore, an inten-
tional effort is needed to help buyers understand their decisions tendencies or nudge
them toward making better decisions that can benefit multiple stakeholders.
Our studies provide a list of managerial insights for buyers and buying firms:
(1) While dual-sourcing and multi-sourcing is prevalent in practice, it is important to
carefully evaluate the specific sourcing settings and not take any sourcing strategy
for granted. Adopting a tailored risk management strategy to a specific risk and
avoiding a blanket solution are critical. Sole-sourcing may emerge as a suitable
strategy for certain settings.
(2) When the pool of potential suppliers comprises candidates with different risk and
cost profiles, it is imperative for buyers to understand the risk structure clearly so
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that they know how their sourcing decisions influence the overall risk exposure of
their supply chains. When the scope of risk is broad and crosses over to the entire
supply base, mixing-and-matching may not reduce risk level but incurs a higher
cost.
(3) Sole-sourcing from and committing to a high-cost, risk-free supplier is an effective
strategy. On the one hand, it avoids the detrimental effect of diversification bias. On
the other hand, it is robust and fool-proof because it prevents other decision errors
associated with order quantity adjustment that is necessary when sole-sourcing from
a low-cost, risky supplier. Moreover, when risky events involve responsibility-related
violations, it is also a ‘win-win’ strategy as it improves firms’ profit performance
and promotes social benefits.
(4) Buying firms may consider nudging buyers’ decisions through training and other
interventions based on the characteristics of their sourcing settings. When the
scope of risk is broad, it is useful to help buyers overcome the tendency to engage in
linear thinking. When the risk involves violations of business practices, subconscious
priming (Welsh and Ordóñez 2014) might be helpful.
Future research on this topic may benefit from testing the implications of these
results in an even broader set of risk types and measuring the effectiveness of different
managerial interventions.
6.2 Influence of Regulatory Risks on Capacity Investment
Decisions
Regulatory risks are emerging worldwide due to various factors, including domestic
nationalism sentiments and heightened geopolitical tensions. Such risks can potentially
disrupt firms’ daily operations and introduce new challenges to global supply chains.
Inspired by the increasing trend in national governments’ active interventions to supply
chains—as exemplified by vaccine export controls during the COVID-19 pandemic—
we use analytical models and a numerical study to examine how regulatory mandates
imposed by a domestic government can influence a vaccine manufacturer’s capacity
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commitment strategy at domestic and overseas locations and the corresponding capacity
levels.
The key theoretical contributions of this dissertation are:
(1) We introduce a way to account for emerging regulatory risks that impose export
restrictions and examine how they influence vaccine manufacturers’ capacity invest-
ment decisions across different locations. We take into consideration two types of
regulatory mandates that exemplify a broad set of regulatory policies in practice
and compare their impacts on manufacturers’ capacity investment decisions.
(2) Our research provides a point of connection between the production and allocation
components in vaccine supply chains (Duijzer et al. 2018) and examines how man-
ufacturers’ capacity investment decisions facing regulatory risks influence vaccine
availability at different locations and result in disparities.
(3) We evaluate the consequences of vaccine manufacturers’ strategic reactions to gov-
ernments’ regulatory mandates from multiple angles (Lemmens et al. 2016). In
addition to using fill rate to assess the service level, we measure the impact on pub-
lic health outcomes using quality-adjusted life year (Whitehead and Ali 2010) by
taking into account the influence of herd immunity (Fine et al. 2011). This combi-
nation provides a more complete picture of the impact of governments’ regulatory
mandates.
It offers the following key practical takeaways:
(1) When facing the risk of governments’ regulatory mandates that restrict vaccine
export, vaccine manufacturers may need to consider shifting their capacity com-
mitment strategy from pooling at one location to diversifying to multiple locations.
This is especially true if the regulatory mandate in question is a random ban and
the unit capacity investment cost is low. If a priority requirement is proposed by
governments, the only scenario under which manufacturers need to consider switch-
ing their strategy is when exporting vaccines to the overseas market is moderately
profitable.
(2) Regardless of whether manufacturers need to switch their capacity commitment
strategy, the optimal capacity levels at domestic locations need to be adjusted.
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Facing a random ban, manufacturers always reduce their domestic capacity levels.
But facing a priority requirement, manufacturers may need to increase or decrease
their domestic capacity levels.
(3) Although domestic capacity levels may decrease because of manufacturers’ strategic
reactions to governments’ regulatory mandates, the resulting domestic service levels
and public outcomes do not always deteriorate, due to the fact that the imposed
mandates direct more available domestic capacities to serve the domestic market.
However, if these mandates induce severe domestic capacity reductions, such policies
may still backfire as domestic service levels and public health outcomes will be worse
than when no mandate is imposed.
(4) Imposed regulatory mandates almost always result in worse service levels and public
health outcomes at overseas locations, creating larger disparities. The overall impact
of these mandates at the global system level may be negative or positive, depending
on the extent to which improvement at domestic locations can compensate for loss
at overseas locations.
(5) The insights generated by our research not only provide guidance for firms in the
vaccine industry but also have potential values for other firms that face similar
regulatory challenges in their global supply chains. On the other hand, governments
may use the results from our research to evaluate the potential impact of their
proposed regulatory mandates and make informed decisions.
Future research can expand the scope of this research from a behavioral angle.
First, prior research in behavioral operations highlights a few interesting behavioral
regularities when decision-makers approach inventory decisions with substitutability
and transshipment options (e.g., Bansal and Moritz 2015, Zhao et al. 2020). Thus, it
might be an important direction to investigate how decision-makers determine capacity
levels across different locations facing regulatory risks so as to understand how such risks
are perceived and how they influence people’s decisions. Second, fairness concerns and
non-financial incentives might be salient factors that influence decision-makers’ choices
in this context, so it will be helpful if future research can unpack the tradeoffs among
these different considerations. Third, to continue our inquiry into individual differences,
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it may be interesting to explore what behavioral factors, such as individual nationalism,
impact people’s decisions in this context.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Study 1
A.1 Proofs
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3.1
To begin with, we can show that (1−γSD)QL+QH 6 d 6 QL+QH in the following
way:
First, we can prove that (1− γSD)Q′L +Q′H = d dominates (1− γSD)Q′L +Q′H > d.
If Q′L = 0, it is easy to see that this relationship holds. If Q
′
L > 0, for any ordering plan
A (Q′L, Q
′
H) with (1− γSD)Q′L +Q′H > d and Q′L > 0, we can always construct a plan
B (QL, QH) such that (1 − γSD)QL + QH = d, QH = Q′H , and Q′L − QL = Q∆ > 0.
Then we have:
πBSD − πASD = (1− γSDδSD)cLQ∆ > 0.
Second, we can prove that Q′L +Q
′




H < d. For any ordering






H < d, we can construct a plan B (QL, QH) such that
QL +QH = d, QH = Q
′
H , and QL −Q′L = Q∆ > 0. Then we have:
πBSD − πASD = (1− γSDδSD)(p− cL)Q∆ > 0.




πSD = (1− δSD)pd+ [(1− γSD)δSDp− (1− γSDδSD)cL]QL + (δSDp− cH)QH .
108
109
Because of this linear relationship, we know that we must have (1−γSD)Q∗L+Q∗H = d
or Q∗L +Q
∗




H must be 0.
Hence, we have the following three potential strategies to consider:
(1) (Q∗L = 0, Q
∗
H = d), and π
1
SD = (p− cH)d;
(2) (Q∗L = d,Q
∗
H = 0), and π
2
SD = (1− γSDδSD)(p− cL)d;
(3) (Q∗L = d/(1− γSD), Q∗H = 0), and π3SD = [p− (1− γSDδSD)cL/(1− γSD)]d.
It is easy to show that:






SD, i.e., if γSDδSD(p− cL) > cH − cL and
γSDcH−γSDδSDcL > cH−cL =⇒ pc∆cH(p−cL) < γSD 6 1 and
c∆










SD, i.e., if γSDδSD(p − cL) 6 cH − cL
and (1−γSDδSD)cL1−γSD > δSDp =⇒ (0 < γSD 6
pc∆
cH(p−cL) and 0 < δSD <
cL
p−γSD(p−cL)) OR
( pc∆cH(p−cL) < γSD 6 1 and 0 < δSD <
c∆
γSD(p−cL)).






SD, i.e., if γSDcH − γSDδSDcL 6 cH − cL




p−γSD(p−cL) < δSD < 1) OR
( pc∆cH(p−cL) < γSD 6 1 and
γSDcH−c∆
γSDcL
< δSD < 1).
By re-arranging the terms, we can obtain Proposition 3.1.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3.2
To prove Proposition 3.2, we can simply arrange the threshold conditions in Propo-
sition 3.1 first by the impact and then by the likelihood.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3.3
Note that if QL = 0, the buyer’s objective function is simply:
max
QH>0
πRV = pmin {QH , d} −QHcH ,
and we see immediately that Q∗H = d.
If QL > 0, we can prove that Q
∗










and QH = 0. Then we can show plan B dominates plan A:
πBRV−πARV = (Q′L−QL)cL+Q′HcH = (Q′L−Q)cL+Q′HcH = −Q′HcL+Q′HcH = (cH−cL)Q′H > 0.
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Hence, the objective function is simplified to be as follows:
max
QL>0
πRV = (1− δRV )pmin {QL, d}+ δRV pmin {QL, (1− γRV )d} −QLcL.
As we see, QL = d strictly dominates any QL > d, so we only need to consider
0 < QL 6 d. In addition, we see that the objective function is linear with respect to
QL no matter 0 < QL 6 (1 − γRV )d or (1 − γRV )d < QL 6 d; therefore, Q∗L can only
be d or (1− γRV )d.
Hence, we have the following three potential strategies to consider:
(1) (Q∗L = 0, Q
∗
H = d), and π
1
RV = (p− cH)d;
(2) (Q∗L = d,Q
∗
H = 0), and π
2
RV = [(1− γRV δRV )p− cL]d;
(3) (Q∗L = (1− γRV )d,Q∗H = 0), and π3RV = (1− γRV )(p− cL)d.
It is easy to show that:






RV , i.e., if γRV δRV p > cH − cL and
γRV (p− cL) > cH − cL =⇒ δRV > c∆γRV p and γRV (p− cL) > c∆.






RV , i.e., if γRV δRV p 6 cH − cL and
cL 6 p(1 − δRV ) =⇒ (0 < γRV 6 c∆p−cL and δRV <
p−cL
p ) OR (
c∆











RV , i.e., if γRV (p − cL) 6 cH − cL and
cL > p(1− δRV ) =⇒ δRV p > p− cL and γRV (p− cL) 6 c∆.
By re-arranging the terms, we can obtain Proposition 3.3.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 3.4
To prove Proposition 3.4, we can simply arrange the threshold conditions in Propo-
sition 3.3 first by the impact and then by the likelihood.
A.2 Experiment Interface Screenshots
Note: Following Gurnani et al. (2014), we balanced the sequence of the two suppliers so
that the low-cost supplier is Supplier A for about half of the participants and is Supplier
B for the others.
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Figure A.1: Background Information of the SD Treatment
Figure A.2: Ordering Decision Page of the SD Treatment
Figure A.3: Outcome Feedback Page of the SD Treatment
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Figure A.4: Background Information of the RV Treatment
Figure A.5: Ordering Decision Page of the RV Treatment
Figure A.6: Outcome Feedback Page of the RV Treatment
Appendix B
Appendix for Study 2
B.1 Analytical Model for the CD Treatment
We denote the likelihood of a contamination disruption by δCD ∈ (0, 1). The impact
of the disruption is captured by the parameter γCD ∈ (0, 1], which represents the pro-
portion of all sourced products that would not be suitable for selling if a contamination
occurs. The buyer’s expected profit in this scenario is as follows:
πCD(QL, QH) =(1− δCD)pmin {QL +QH , d}+ δCDpmin {(1− γCD)(QL +QH), d}
−QLcL −QHcH .
(B.1)
Proposition B.1 characterizes the buyer’s profit-maximizing sourcing strategy in this
setting.
Proposition B.1. When sourcing from supplier L introduces potential contamination
disruption risk, the profit-maximizing strategy is to sole-source as follows:







(2) Select supplier L and












(b) set Q = QL = d/(1− γCD), otherwise.
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Proof. Proof of Proposition B.1.
The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 3.3 and thus omitted.
The following proposition summarizes the insights when the likelihood level in-
creases:
Proposition B.2. An increase in the likelihood of contamination disruption influences
the buyer’s optimal sourcing strategy as follows:
(1) Low impact condition (γCD 6
c∆
cH
): the buyer always chooses supplier L but the
order quantity Q∗L increases from d to d/(1 − γCD) as δCD crosses the threshold
cL
p(1−γCD) from below;
(2) High impact condition (γCD >
c∆
cH
): the buyer always chooses to order Q = d but





Proof. Proof of Proposition B.2.
To prove Proposition B.2, we can simply arrange the threshold conditions in Propo-
sition B.1 first by the impact and then by the likelihood.
B.2 Experiment Interface Screenshots: Background Infor-
mation
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Figure B.1: Supply Disruption (SD) Risk Treatment
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Figure B.2: Responsibility Violation (RV) Risk Treatment
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Figure B.3: Safety Violation (SV) Risk Treatment
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Figure B.4: Reputation Disruption (RD) Risk Treatment
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Figure B.5: Contamination Disruption (CD) Risk Treatment
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B.3 Experiment Interface Screenshots: Ordering Page and
Outcome Feedback Page (using the SD Treatment as
an example)
Figure B.6: Ordering Decision Page: Initial State
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Figure B.7: Evaluating Order Quantities: Dual-sourcing
Figure B.8: Evaluating Order Quantities: Sole-sourcing from L
122
Figure B.9: Evaluating Order Quantities: Sole-sourcing from H
Figure B.10: Outcome Feedback: No Disruption
Figure B.11: Outcome Feedback: Disruption
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B.4 Survey Questions to Assess Linear Thinking
SD
Suppose there is a 25% likelihood that a machine breakdown occurs at Supplier A. If
such an issue occurs, 70% of products ordered from Supplier A will not be delivered to
you. Supplier B has no risk of a machine breakdown.
Under which scenario would there be a larger consequence if a machine breakdown
occurred at Supplier A?
Scenario 1: ordering 20 units from Supplier A and 80 units from Supplier B
Scenario 2: ordering 40 units from Supplier A and 60 units from Supplier B
(i) Scenario 1
(ii) Scenario 2
(iii) Same for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2
RV
Suppose there is a 25% likelihood that a labor violation occurs at Supplier A and news
of your procurement from them becomes public. If such an issue occurs, 70% consumers
in the market will not purchase your product. There is no such risk with Supplier B
since they always comply with labor regulations.
Under which scenario would there be a larger consequence if a labor violation occurred
at Supplier A and news of your procurement from them became public?
Scenario 1: ordering 20 units from Supplier A and 80 units from Supplier B
Scenario 2: ordering 40 units from Supplier A and 60 units from Supplier B
(i) Scenario 1
(ii) Scenario 2
(iii) Same for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2
Appendix C
Appendix for Study 3
C.1 Optimal Capacity Decisions when Demand is Deter-
ministic
When demand is deterministic instead of random, it is straightforward to obtain the
manufacturer’s optimal capacity investment decisions as follows.
In the base case,
K =
(D1 +D2, 0)′ if vO 6 vT(D1, D2)′ if vO > vT .
In the random ban condition,
K =
(D1 +D2, 0)′ if vO 6 (1− δ)vT(D1, D2)′ if vO > (1− δ)vT .
In the priority requirement condition,
K =
(D1 +D2, 0)′ if vO 6 vT(D1, D2)′ if vO > vT .
From this set of results, we can see that a priority requirement does not influence
the manufacturer’s optimal capacity decisions. However, a random ban may change the
manufacturer’s strategy. Specifically, if (1 − δ)vT < vO 6 vT , the manufacturer will
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switch from pooling to diversifying when a random ban is imposed by the government.
When vO is either too low or too high, the random ban has no impact: if vO 6 (1−δ)vT ,
the manufacturer always chooses to pool, while if vO > vT , the manufacturer always
chooses to diversify.
C.2 Proofs
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5.1.
We start with the OT scenario (shown in Figure 5.2(1)). The shadow prices, λ, of
the two capacity constraints in the second-stage problems by each region are:
Table C.1: Shadow Prices of the Two Capacity Constraints in the OT Scenario
Region Shadow Price λ
Ω0 (0, 0)
Ω1 (0, vO − vT )
Ω2 (vD, vD + vO − vT )
Ω3 (vT , vO)
Ω4 (vD, 0)
Let H denote the Hessian matrix of ΠBC(K). For an interior solution K
∗, we have:
H = D2KΠBC(K) = D
2




0 0 vD vT vD






















−vDa3 − vDa2 + (vD − vT )a1 −vDa2 + (vD − vT )a1
−vDa2 + (vD − vT )a1
−vDa2 + (vD − vT )a1 − (vO − vT )a4−






f(D1,K1 +K2) dD1, a2 =
∫ K1
0












To simplify the notation, let A1 = vDa3, A2 = vDa2 − (vD − vT )a1, and A3 =







Recall that in the OT scenario, 0 < vD < vT < vO. Hence, −(vD − vT ) > 0 and
vO − vT > 0. As a result, A2 > 0 and A3 > 0. Since it is clear that A1 > 0, we know
that H is negative, symmetric, and diagonally dominant, guaranteeing H to be negative
definite. This proves that ΠBC is concave in K in the OT scenario.
The proof for the other scenarios is similar and thus omitted.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 5.1.
(1) We start with the OT scenario (shown in Figure 5.2(1)). Suppose a boundary
solution exists under which it is optimal to pool and the optimal capacity decisions are:
K∗ = (K∗1 > 0,K
∗
2 = 0).


















































It is clear that µ1 = 0. Hence,
vDP (Ω2(K
∗)) + vTP (Ω3(K
∗)) = c,
vDP (Ω2(K
∗))− vT [P (Ω1(K∗)) + P (Ω2(K∗))]
+vO [P (Ω1(K
∗)) + P (Ω2(K
∗)) + P (Ω3(K
∗))] = c− µ2.
Solving for µ2, we can get the following solution:
µ2 = −(vO − vT ) [P (Ω1(K∗)) + P (Ω2(K∗)) + P (Ω3(K∗))] .
Recall that in the OT scenario vT < vO. Hence, µ2 < 0, which contradicts to µi > 0.
Therefore, it is always optimal to diversify in the OT scenario. We can use the same
approach to show that it is always optimal to diversify in the OD scenario.
(2) Next, we focus on the DT scenario (shown in Figure 5.2(3)). Suppose a boundary
solution exists under which it is optimal to pool and the optimal capacity decisions are:
K∗ = (K∗1 > 0,K
∗
2 = 0).


















































As µ1 = 0, we can solve for µ2 and obtain the following solution:
µ2 = (−vO + vT )P (Ω2(K∗)) + (vD − vO)P (Ω3(K∗)).
Note that in the DT scenario we have vO < vT < vD, which implies that vD−vO > 0
and vO − vT < 0. Hence
(vD − vO)P (Ω3(K∗)) > (vO − vT )P (Ω2(K∗)).
That is to say, µ2 is always positive. Thus, it is always optimal to pool in the DT
scenario. We can use the same approach to show that it is always optimal to pool in
the TM and TE scenarios.
(3) Lastly, we examine the DO scenario (shown in Figure 5.2(4)). Suppose a bound-
ary solution exists under which it is optimal to pool and the optimal capacity decisions
are: K̃DO = (K̃DO1 > 0, K̃
DO
2 = 0).


















































As µ1 = 0, we can solve for µ2 and obtain the following solution:
µ2 = c+ vTP (Ω1(K̃
DO))− vO.
If c + vTP (Ω1(K̃
DO)) − vO > 0, or c > vT − vTPr(D1 + D2 6 K̃DO1 ), it is optimal
to pool. Otherwise, it is optimal to diversify.
Rearranging the conditions based on when it is optimal to diversify vs. pool yields
Proposition 5.1.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 5.2.
When the export ban is activated, the problem is similar to a separable two-item
newsvendor problem. Since we know that a newsvendor’s expected profit function is
concave, we know that ΠB(K1,K2) is concave. Because we have ΠRB(K1,K2) = (1 −
δ)ΠBC(K1,K2) + δΠB(K1,K2), and know that both ΠBC(K1,K2) and ΠB(K1,K2) are
concave, we know immediately that ΠRB(K1,K2) is concave.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 5.2.
The proof of Proposition 5.2 is similar to that of Proposition 5.1 and thus omitted.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 5.1.
Corollary 5.1 directly follows Propositions 5.1 and 5.2. By reorganizing the condi-
tions, we can show the conditions under which it is optimal to stay diversifying, stay
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pooling, or switch from pooling to diversifying. Corollary 5.1 selectively highlights the
conditions that induce the manufacturer to change its capacity commitment strategy.
The only thing that needs to be shown is that under no circumstance the manufacturer
should switch from diversifying to pooling.
Suppose that under certain conditions the manufacturer may switch from diversify-
ing to pooling. This requires: vT < vO < vD and vO − (1− δ)vTPDO1 < c < vO − vTP1.




i.e., the optimal domestic investment level in the random ban condition is greater than
that in the base case. To understand the relative ordering of the two capacity investment
levels, we return to the optimality conditions under the two conditions:
vT (1− P (Ω1(K̃DO))) + (vD − vT )P (Ω3(K̃DO)) = c,
vT (1− δ)(1− P (Ω1(K̂DO))) + (vD − vT (1− δ))P (Ω3(K̂DO)) = c.
If K̃DO1 < K̂
DO
1 , then P (Ω1(K̂
DO)) > P (Ω1(K̃
DO)) and P (Ω3(K̂
DO)) < P (Ω3(K̃
DO)).
Let x = P (Ω1(K̂
DO)) − P (Ω1(K̃DO)) and y = P (Ω3(K̃DO)) − P (Ω3(K̂DO)), then we
have:
vT (1− δ)(1− P (Ω1(K̃DO))− x) + (vD − vT (1− δ))(P (Ω3(K̃DO))− y)
−
[
vT (1− P (Ω1(K̃DO))) + (vD − vT )P (Ω3(K̃DO))
]
= 0.
Solving for x, we have:







1 )) = 1 − P (Ω1(K̃DO1 )) − P (Ω3(K̃DO1 )). Note that this contradicts to
x > 0. Hence, K̃DO1 > K̂
DO
1 , which in turn shows that the manufacturer will never
switch from diversifying to pooling.
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C.3 Non-concavity of the Manufacturer’s Expected Profit
Function in the Priority Requirement Condition
In Figure C.1, we provide a counter-example to show that the manufacturer’s ex-
pected profit function is not always concave in the priority requirement condition.
In this example, the manufacturer’s expected profit function is not concave because
(ΠTMPR (3, 3) + Π
TM
PR (55, 15))/2 = 51.32 > 45.76 = Π
TM
PR ((55 + 3)/2, (15 + 3)/2). The red
line segment in the figure show (3, 3, 10.34)− (55, 15, 92.30).
Figure C.1: ΠTMPR (K1,K2) when d1 = d2 = 100, vD = 1.4, vO = 4.75, vT = 6.14, and
c = 1.35
